The History of WWII Podcast XX
[0] Welcome to True Spies, the podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time.
[1] Suddenly out of the dark, it's a bit in love.
[2] You'll meet the people who live life undercover.
[3] What do they know?
[4] What are their skills?
[5] And what would you do in their position?
[6] Vengeance felt good seeing these.
[7] People paid for what they'd done, felt righteous.
[8] True Spies, from Spyscape Studios, wherever you get your podcasts.
[9] This episode is brought to you by Audible .com.
[10] As you know, Audible has a plethora of audiobooks to choose from.
[11] I certainly have my recommendation this time, but if you don't like what I'm suggesting, you can pick something else.
[12] Audible has thrillers, romance, radio programs from years gone by, and biographies.
[13] And of course, that's not a complete list.
[14] You see, the great thing about an audiobook is, if it's a trashy romance novel you want to read, a sci -fi book you're too embarrassed to read in front of your serious and judgmental co -workers, or if you want to hear TFA's new book, Bossy Pants, while you're at the gym in front of the guys, you can.
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[19] I won't tell.
[20] This go -around, I'd like to go in a different direction and recommend a new book in the New York Times best -selling author W .E .B. Griffin's Honor -Bound Saga of World War II Espionage, Victory and Honor.
[21] We all know Mr. Griffin doesn't need me helping him sell his books, but I saw this one and just had to have it.
[22] It starts out just weeks after Hitler's suicide.
[23] So Cletus Frayed and his colleagues of the OSS, America's intelligence agency created during World War II, find themselves up to their necks in battles every bit as fierce as the ones they just left.
[24] The first one is political.
[25] the very survival of the OSS, with every department from Treasury to war to FBI grabbing everything they can, their agents and their assets.
[26] The second one, and this is one that I enjoyed a lot, was on a much grander scale.
[27] They had to deal with the possible next world war against Joseph Stalin and his voracious ambitions.
[28] It's well -researched, just like all his other books, and reads like a rollercoaster ride.
[29] So...
[30] If I've offended any of you purists out there, I apologize.
[31] But hey, you can still learn a lot from fiction like this.
[32] on June 13th, showed the ministers what Pétain and Véga intended to do all along.
[33] That the military was supposed to be supplicant to the civilian government was somehow lost on everyone involved.
[34] Véga was still in a huff, but mercifully not nearby, so Pétain had to act.
[35] Early on the morning of June 14th, the marshal went to see Admiral Darlan.
[36] The Navy had thus far not been involved in defending France.
[37] Still, Darlan, like many of the politicians and ranking officers, was wavering as the battle turned in Germany's favor.
[38] Bétain uncharacteristically got right to the point when he was alone with Darlan.
[39] The Marshal told the Admiral that the war was lost and that the Cabinet had lost its way.
[40] We should consider forming a consulate.
[41] Quote, Why shouldn't you, Darlan, become the first consul?
[42] Unquote.
[43] being as human as the next politician was won over to Patin's side.
[44] Of course, Patin didn't really plan on a consulate or allowing Darlan to be the leader.
[45] And while it's true Darlan was saying yes for himself and for his own glory, many a man in history has been won over to one side or another for much less.
[46] After this very satisfying conversation, the vice premier planned on leaving for Bordeaux, where the government would meet again the next day.
[47] But Pétain had one more person to talk to, one more brick to lay in the building of his foundation for a new France.
[48] Pétain knew that Badeau, the undersecretary of the Foreign Office, had recently come to his side.
[49] So Pétain shared his frustration about the cabinet with the undersecretary and claimed he would see an end to it.
[50] Although it was quite out of his jurisdiction, Pétain said to Badeau he had set a deadline of Saturday, June 15th, noon.
[51] for the cabinet to see an armistice was the only way to save France.
[52] But the vice premier was only getting started in his new role of agent provocateur.
[53] Once at Bordeaux, he sent a telegram to Commander -in -Chief Vegard.
[54] Because this note came from the marshal, the telegram was quickly in Vegard's hand at 5 .30 that afternoon.
[55] Sometimes, it seems, the communications of the French military worked just fine.
[56] The note filled Vaigant in on what he had missed since storming out of the meeting last night.
[57] The French government, in the form of Renault, was making contact with the U .S. president and asking for aid.
[58] The cabinet was hoping for a declaration of war by the U .S. and wanted to see what, if anything, was offered in the way of assistance before deciding what course to take.
[59] It read, the marshal, he referred to himself in the third person in the note, as Vaigant did when testifying after the war.
[60] In essence, the Marshal of France and Vice Premier was going behind the back of the leader of the government.
[61] and ordering the commander -in -chief to leave his command post, which was supposed to be moving to Vichy that day, and report to him personally before the cabinet meeting was held.
[62] Renaud was busy as well, but he was far less productive than his vice premier.
[63] Before leaving Tours and heading for Verdot in the southwest, the despondent leader of the French sent off his appeal to President Roosevelt.
[64] The plea was emotional and anxious, but Renaud already knew what the response would be.
[65] no matter how regretful the tone.
[66] Most historians speculate that Renault was doing this not only for the record, but to then have something concrete to point at and offer up as an excuse, flimsy as it may be.
[67] By the evening of June 14th, the cabinet members made it to Bordeaux, a port city on the Garonne River in southwest France, about 100 miles north of the French -Spanish border.
[68] This city had seen the recent low points of French history.
[69] It was used as a temporary capital in 1871 when the Germans had taken Paris and again in 1914 when that almost happened a second time.
[70] Now the city reeked of defeat and despair.
[71] It was as if the very fabric of French society was decomposing.
[72] Of the thousands that had made it this far, they couldn't imagine having to flee any further.
[73] It just had to be the end of their torment.
[74] But for some, it was only the beginning.
[75] The many Jews who had fled eastern France or from other countries already under Hitler clamored for passports, but were having a hard time of it.
[76] Anti -Semitism was rearing its ugly head again as Nazi propaganda spread and blamed the war between Germany and France on the Jewish influence.
[77] It might sound hard to believe today, but at least the frightened refugees then had someone to blame.
[78] The local politicians tried to organize the incoming masses as best they could, but it could be argued that the mayor of Bordeaux was the most successful.
[79] Adrien Marquet had turned away from the Socialist Party in 1933 and inched towards fascism and National Socialism since then.
[80] He also wanted the armistice and volunteered to find housing for the cabinet and for the 200 or so members of parliament.
[81] So those who wanted to continue the fight against Germany found themselves billeted in hotels near the railroad, which was being bombed by the Germans.
[82] Those who wanted to capitulate were placed in hotels that turned out to be in less dangerous parts of the city.
[83] Such did politics play a part in these people's lives.
[84] But Mayor Macquet wasn't stupid.
[85] He made sure Renaud's mistress got a good, safe place as well.
[86] He also made sure that Pierre Laval...
[87] got put into an office next to his at the Hôtel des Villes.
[88] Starting the very next day, June 15th, Marquet's office would become the center of the conspiracy against Renault, for that's surely what it was.
[89] For a long time, Laval had wanted to see Pétain in the top spot.
[90] He shared the idea that the blame for the war should rest on Renault's shoulders.
[91] However, the premier should not be allowed to negotiate the ending.
[92] Laval was hoping Pétain once he was in charge, would allow him the honor.
[93] Laval, a former premier, had been forced to resign in January of 1936 in shame, and now was the time for his revenge against the French left and the British.
[94] Renaud finally made it to town about 6 .30 p .m. It had been a harrowing journey, watching hundreds of thousands and quite possibly millions of his countrymen running before the German advance.
[95] But the temporary capital was already buzzing with intrigue.
[96] deception, and conspiracies.
[97] In fact, it would have been hard for him to miss. Two days later, he would find out that the military had been bugging his phone.
[98] It was decided the premier would stay with the general commanding the 18th military region.
[99] The president was placed nearby Renault, but Pétain settled himself on the other side of town.
[100] However, he spent most of his time holding court at the Hotel des Villes.
[101] Renault couldn't help but see the defeated looks on almost everyone's face and had to be honest with himself and admit the Battle of France was lost.
[102] The French army was beaten and unable to halt or even slow down the German advance.
[103] But he still believed that France could continue to resist from its North African possessions.
[104] Certainly, all the other defeated governments had removed themselves to remain in the fight.
[105] The only positive item on the French tally sheet was its navy, and that had hardly fired a shot so far.
[106] It was certainly sufficient to protect the government once the move was made.
[107] Back on the political scene, and this may be hard for non -French to fathom, Renault thought he had found another piece of potential good news.
[108] Pétain and others had sworn never to leave metropolitan France, and jurisdictionally, Algeria was a part of that.
[109] Maybe this could be the beginning of a compromise with Pétain and his followers.
[110] That night...
[111] Renault turned to the only person in uniform that was on his side, Brigadier General and now Undersecretary for the Ministry of National Defense, Charles de Gaulle.
[112] Renault shared his thoughts about the movement de Gaulle, and the stolid soldier tried to arouse his superior.
[113] De Gaulle told Renault, if you stay here, you will sink under all this defeatism.
[114] You must go to North Africa.
[115] Will you do it?
[116] Renault declared, oui.
[117] That decided for de Gaulle his next course of action.
[118] He would go to Britain and arrange for transport for the French government and as many troops as they could gather for the trip.
[119] De Gaulle asked where he could find his premier once he was back, and he said, you will find me in Algeria.
[120] Near midnight on the 14th, after de Gaulle had left for London, the British ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell, and General Spears met with Renault.
[121] They had decided amongst themselves, and with the approval of London, to see the premier as often as they could and continually shower him with their resolve and strength of spirit.
[122] But looking back on those tense days, theirs was probably just two more of the many voices ringing in Renault's ears and making it hard for him to think.
[123] That was certainly true when their cheerleading was laced with a warning that Britain expected the French government to keep its word and not make a separate peace with Hitler.
[124] But Renault knew this Battle of France was coming to a close.
[125] They had run almost as far as they could, and the army was beaten.
[126] Still, he would fight the Germans, and he would fight Pétain, Végan, and anyone else taking their side.
[127] But Renault had to be logical when he looked at his own political battlefield.
[128] The cabinet was split, and no one could honestly say they knew how the majority would vote.
[129] De Gaulle was in Britain, and his main support, the Parliament, would not be with him on the morrow.
[130] Too few had shown up to constitute a quorum and so could not be formally assembled.
[131] The chamber and the Senate would not be there for him.
[132] As Pétain's self -declared deadline approached, new events helped propel the crisis to a fever pitch.
[133] As the sun rose on June 15th, it was time to start the great game, and Admiral Darlat was the prize all wanted and needed.
[134] As the man in charge of the French fleet, he was vital.
[135] Of course, no one, especially Renault, knew the Admiral was already in Pétain's camp.
[136] That morning, Darlan met with Érioux, the Speaker of the Chamber, and asked, Is it true those bastards, Pétain and Végan, wish to conclude an armistice?
[137] If so, I'm leaving with the fleet.
[138] If Darlan fulfilled his threat, and we'll just call it a bluff here, it would have been the end of the generals.
[139] Hitler had the French beat.
[140] What he wanted was their warships.
[141] A critical part of Pétain's plan was to use the ships to get a decent deal from the cagey and ruthless negotiator in Berlin.
[142] At 9 a .m., Darlan was summoned to Renault.
[143] Renault told Darlan to move with all haste to gather ships together for a move to North Africa.
[144] Darlan thought the idea was ridiculous.
[145] He had felt the same way when Operation Dynamo began.
[146] But looking back on the results of Dunkirk, one can't help but feel this idea at least had enough merit to try.
[147] It was to save the French government and French honor, after all.
[148] But for the Admiral, this meeting was the last straw, if he had needed any more proof of which way to go.
[149] So, after calling the two leading conspirators bastards, he was soon in the Hôtel -Ville, along with Badeau and others, listening to Bataan hold court.
[150] His decision was made.
[151] Welcome to True Spies.
[152] The podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time.
[153] Suddenly out of the dark it's appeared in love.
[154] You'll meet the people who live life undercover.
[155] What do they know?
[156] What are their skills?
[157] And what would you do in their position?
[158] Vengeance felt good.
[159] Seeing these people pay for what they'd done felt righteous.
[160] True Spies from Spyscape Studios.
[161] Wherever you get your podcasts.
[162] General Van Gaal.
[163] showed up at 2 .30 p .m. that day of June 15th and went to the hotel as ordered.
[164] Now that the last piece was in place, the meeting they had did not last very long.
[165] It didn't need to.
[166] They agreed that an armistice had to be sought with the Germans.
[167] Bedouin greased the wheels considerably when he lied and told the group that two days ago, Churchill told Renault that he understood if France found itself having to treat with the hated enemy.
[168] This eased the conscience of the military men who were bound to protect and serve their country.
[169] But intrigue needs heat, passion, and conflict, and it got that right before the 4 p .m. cabinet meeting.
[170] Vegard went to see Renaud, who was, after all, his superior.
[171] The premier was beside himself with joy, as he had recently stumbled upon a new idea that might save this entire situation.
[172] He ordered the commander -in -chief to call for a ceasefire.
[173] This would allow the French government to make their way to Africa in relative safety.
[174] Of course, why he thought Hitler would automatically grant this, especially since he was winning, is unclear.
[175] But Vega declared he would not ask for a ceasefire.
[176] It was too shameful.
[177] Renault told him it was an order and that he would take responsibility.
[178] Vega again told his leader he would not.
[179] It was becoming clear to Renault, although almost too late to do anything about it, that Vega was a royalist at heart.
[180] He wasn't the only one.
[181] and probably didn't mind seeing the Republic collapse.
[182] But it was now 4 p .m., and so the two combatants stopped yelling at each other and went to the cabinet meeting.
[183] Renault had every intention of firing the Generalissimo at this meeting, but like many of his other intentions, it did not come about.
[184] With everyone in attendance, presided by President Lebrun, Vegard started the meeting by bringing them all up to date on the military situation.
[185] The center of the French front was gone.
[186] There was no organization of any kind.
[187] To the east, the 6th Army was cut in two, and further east, the three French armies of the Maginot Line were about to be encircled.
[188] Of course, Vegard left out the part about himself delaying the order for general retreat that could have given the men of the Maginot Line time to head west before it being cut off.
[189] Ending his briefing, Vegard asked the cabinet again to consider an armistice, and then left as directed by the president.
[190] Weygan would be nearby, but not allowed to disrupt the meetings as before.
[191] With the general out of the room, Renaud implored his ministers to keep resisting Germany, but then Chautam, one of Renaud's few supposed supporters, stepped in and talked of the suffering French soldiers and the mass of refugees running away from everything they had once owned.
[192] Renaud, shocked, must have thought, this is not helping me. So he cut in by saying that is why he has ordered the general to ask for a temporary ceasefire.
[193] It would stop the fighting right away, whereas an armistice could take days, and that would be with the fighting still going on.
[194] This impressed the cabinet as the way to go, and it would also protect the military's honor.
[195] So President Lebrun asked Pétain to find Vega and convince him to ask for a ceasefire.
[196] Clearly Pétain was not happy about this unexpected turn, but he agreed.
[197] and left the room.
[198] Pétain returned 15 minutes later and said he was unable to change the commander -in -chief's mind about asking for the ceasefire.
[199] The question is, did he really ask?
[200] Of course, we will never know the answer to that.
[201] Renaud, bitter, again resolved to rid himself of Vegard.
[202] But why didn't he bring it up right then?
[203] It's another unanswered question.
[204] Instead, Renaud then said to the ministers, I now put it up to the cabinet.
[205] What should be done?
[206] An armistice?
[207] or moving to North Africa.
[208] But then, Camille Chautam, the deputy director and number three man of the government, spoke up again and threw his hat into the ring.
[209] After Renaud asked what the cabinet wanted to do, Chautam got up and all eyes turned to him.
[210] Renaud and his supporters were hopeful, as Chautam was respected, and after all, was with the premier.
[211] So as Chautam stepped forward, Renaud could only assume this coming speech would be in support.
[212] of continuing the struggle.
[213] Very persuasively, Chautamp put forward that the idea was to find a way for France to keep on fighting and possibly leave for North Africa without the people losing heart and turning against their government.
[214] The cabinet agreed with this, so he continued.
[215] The cabinet should trick Germany by asking not for an armistice, but for the conditions of an armistice.
[216] If the terms were too harsh, his followers, and the French people will agree we should fight on and suffer accordingly.
[217] Renaud, shocked, was certainly not happy to hear this.
[218] He recognized it as a trick and said so.
[219] Even taking one step down the path of an armistice would cut off all other options.
[220] Of course, this is what Pétain and secretly Chautam wanted.
[221] So Renaud pointed out the obvious, that even by asking for terms, the army would lose heart.
[222] Who wanted to fight and die when the war was about to be over?
[223] Renault kept up his fight against the proposal, but it was too late.
[224] What ministers there were against the armistice were now only too happy to have this compromise, and it showed on their faces.
[225] They assumed it was a clever idea, a good compromise.
[226] But only after France was broken in two would they realize this proposal had been the first major step.
[227] Pétain nodded his agreement to the proposal.
[228] Renault had no choice, so took a vote.
[229] There were 13 votes for the Chotam proposal and six against.
[230] Renaud turned to the president and said he would have to resign.
[231] The normally passive, weak -willed president shouted that if Renaud left, he would do the same.
[232] Then, remembering he was the president and just couldn't walk away, calmed down and begged Renaud to go along with the majority.
[233] The first thing they had to do was sound out the British on allowing them to inquire of Germany what exactly the conditions for an armistice would be.
[234] Renault had been neatly trapped.
[235] If he resigned, Bétain would surely take over and ask for an armistice.
[236] If he stayed, well, that really was his only choice to keep France in the fight.
[237] So he agreed to send the question to London, but on the condition that the note stipulated it was backed by the majority of the cabinet.
[238] Secretly, Renault assumed that Britain would say no and thus strengthen his hand.
[239] While Renault was battling his enemies in the cabinet, and finding more lined up against him by the hour.
[240] There were others fighting outside the cabinet.
[241] Pierre Laval was gathering adherents, even though they only knew of his immediate goal of replacing Renault with Béton.
[242] He planned on going much further than taking down the premier.
[243] He wanted to see the entire republic go down as well.
[244] The meeting ended at 8 p .m., June 15, and Renault left, but only to run into Vegard.
[245] who had been dismissed and was waiting outside for the last two hours.
[246] Probably goaded by his hatred for the commander -in -chief, Renault told Vega that the cabinet favored a capitulation by the army.
[247] Vega exploded, and he screamed he would never give up his armies.
[248] He declared that the end of the war should be like the beginning, done by the government, not the army.
[249] At this time, And for many years after, no one was able to get Vega to explain the difference between the government asking for an armistice and the military capitulating.
[250] The result was the same, and it was Renault's call to make.
[251] But Vega refused, and inexplicably was never sacked.
[252] Renault had heard all of this before and so walked away.
[253] But Vega was too worked up now.
[254] Vega found the president and started yelling at him.
[255] But LeBron wasn't about to take all this alone, so he had Renault called back.
[256] He came, but this had no effect on the commander -in -chief.
[257] He yelled at them both that he would never give up his army.
[258] Again, this is supposed to be the part of the story where the premier rids himself of this independent commander -in -chief and has the full support of the president.
[259] But it did not happen that way.
[260] In fact, Vegard stormed away from them.
[261] He then visited Pétain, filled him in on the latest confrontation, and then took his train to Vichy at 9 p .m. He had played his part.
[262] to perfection.
[263] By the end of June 15th, the military's professional opinion was more than ever convinced that Britain would fall within days after France quit fighting.
[264] So the civilians were asking themselves why continue to worry about their partnership with the very next victim of Nazi Germany.
[265] The two verbal fights with Vegard and having the knife slipped between his ribs from behind by Chautam sapped which strength Renault had left.
[266] If there had been any, it's certain that his mistress ripped it from him.
[267] She, more than anyone else, according to the British witnesses, constantly harped on him to end the conflict.
[268] In this weakened state, Renault thought his only salvation was in the form of Roosevelt.
[269] So another telegram was sent to the U .S. president that stated, we, France, have two options, surrender or fight from North Africa.
[270] And it will depend on you what that answer will be.
[271] Feeling better, having put the onus on the U .S., Renaud was ready to send the Chautam proposal to Churchill, so he called in the British ambassador and General Spears.
[272] Renaud told them what he was about to write.
[273] As Mr. Churchill stated at Tours, he would agree that France should sue for an armistice.
[274] But Spears stopped him before he could go any further, saying that was completely false.
[275] Renaud replied that Badeau heard Churchill say that.
[276] Clearly, the pressure was affecting the Premier.
[277] After all, he had been at the meeting as well.
[278] Spears denied the statement again, and the French minutes of the tour meeting was found.
[279] Badeau's lie was exposed.
[280] So, Renaud started again.
[281] He wrote that the military situation was quickly decaying, and if the government left now, the French people and armies would lose faith in them.
[282] But, at the same time, we all know Hitler's terms would be unacceptable.
[283] So now France is stuck between a rock and a hard place.
[284] In fact, the government may collapse.
[285] But if Britain agrees to let France ask Germany for the conditions for an armistice, the French people will see this and support our move to North Africa.
[286] And of course, the French fleet will never go to Germany.
[287] Also, if you say no, I will probably have to resign.
[288] Spears read it and argued against sending it.
[289] But strangely, Renault argued more passionately for it.
[290] than Chautam did.
[291] As Renault finished his note, the reply from Roosevelt came.
[292] The answer was a gentle, respectful, long -winded no. So Renault added on to his note to Churchill that, We previously agreed if the response from the U .S. was negative, we could re -examine the British letting France ask for an armistice.
[293] So now I put forward my request again.
[294] He ended by saying he would like a reply by Sunday morning, June 16th.
[295] The message reached London at 1 .30 a .m., June 16.
[296] The early morning hours of Sunday found Renault harassing the British ambassador and General Spears about a reply from London.
[297] They attempted to calmly point out that there had not been enough time yet to realistically expect a reply.
[298] Pétain knew that Végan was in Vichy, so he would have to act, something he liked to leave to others.
[299] The cabinet meeting got started.
[300] but it didn't get very far before Pétain rose and started reading out his resignation letter.
[301] He read that he could not stay in a government that would not end the conflict that was destroying the country.
[302] But before he could finish his dignified exit, or rather, dignified next move, President Lebrun cut him off by saying, you're not leaving us at this time, but oh no. Then Renaud joined in, calmly saying, I have not read or replied in writing to your request to resign.
[303] So how can you act on it yet?
[304] Pétain said he understood, but refused to sit down.
[305] So he stood there with his letter in his hand.
[306] Renaud continued, I have only, hours ago, written to the British about the Chautam proposal.
[307] Don't you think we should give them more time to act on it?
[308] Pétain sat down, and the meeting was adjourned until 5 p .m. But Renault was not even allowed to enjoy this small victory.
[309] As he left the Rome, he almost bumped into Vegard, who had flown back from Vichy that morning.
[310] They immediately went into their same argument.
[311] Renault would not accept an armistice, and Vegard would not ask for a ceasefire, as it would shame the honor of the French army.
[312] He then added he would not do so even if ordered.
[313] Renault then again resolved to sack Vegard, but again it did not come to pass.
[314] So while they argued in circles, Churchill's reply came in.
[315] As everything else in this sad drama, it was a mixed blessing.
[316] It read, Mr. Churchill to Monsieur Renaud, London, 16th June, 1940, 1235 p .m. Our agreement forbidding separate negotiations, whether for armistice or peace, was made with the French Republic and not with any particular French administration or statesman.
[317] It thereby involves the honor of France.
[318] Nevertheless, provided, but only provided, that the French fleet is sailed forthwith for British harbors pending negotiations, His Majesty's government give their full consent to an inquiry by the French government to ascertain the terms for an armistice for France.
[319] At least, the British could argue, they had been consistent.
[320] But General Spears and Ambassador Campbell did not like the reply.
[321] Once the path of an armistice was started, there could be no turning back.
[322] but they had their duty to perform.
[323] They took the note to Renault, who was by now exhausted beyond belief, and his only response was a surly and comprehensible defiance.
[324] He replied that he needed the ships to defend the government once it was moved to North Africa from the Italian Navy.
[325] The two Britons were becoming angry and confused at the same time.
[326] What exactly were the French asking for?
[327] As this played out, another message came from London just before 4 p .m., but this one was from the Foreign Office.
[328] It read, You should inform Monsieur Renault that we expect to be consulted as soon as any armistice terms are received.
[329] You should impress upon the French government that in stipulating for removal of the French fleet to British ports, we have in mind French interests as well as our own, and are convinced that it will strengthen the hands of the French government in any armistice discussions if they can show that the French navy is out of the reach of German forces.
[330] But Renault would not agree to having the ships head for British ports.
[331] Of course, Renault's opponents would have agreed with him, but for different reasons.
[332] They wanted to use the ships for a better bargaining point against Germany.
[333] But then the phone rang, and what Renault heard drove all thoughts of ships and annoying generals from his mind.
[334] On the other end was de Gaulle, who was clearly excited.
[335] He called from London and started explaining a plan that might give the Premier and France the hope it desperately needed.
[336] Renault wrote as de Gaulle explained.
[337] De Gaulle described a proposal for a declaration of union between Great Britain and France.
[338] There would be one Franco -British union with a combined defense, foreign and financial policies, as well as mutual citizenship.
[339] Then Churchill got on the phone and the two leaders agreed to meet off the coast of Brittany to discuss the details.
[340] Instantly, Renault was his former cocksure self.
[341] He would defeat Bataan and, if lucky, the Nazis too.
[342] Everyone assumed that this idea superseded the two previous telegrams.
[343] But what no one bothered to ask or ascertain was if the telegrams became effective again, if this union fell through.
[344] So the cabinet reconvened at 5 p .m. The room had an expectant air.
[345] Everyone knew this standoff had to end soon.
[346] It was either the armistice or Africa.
[347] Renaud started the meeting, but the various witnesses have disputed what he said exactly.
[348] It's most likely that Renault told the cabinet and president that Britain rejected the idea of France asking for armistice conditions, which was not exactly true.
[349] And Renault gave no notice if he saw the look of shock on their faces.
[350] Anyway, he practically flew over that point, much too focused on what he was about to say.
[351] He quickly got to what brought him so much relief and assumed it would do the same for the cabinet.
[352] He told the ministers that he had just talked to General de Gaulle.
[353] and explained the idea of the Union proposal and what it would mean for France now and after the war.
[354] France could not be defeated by Germany because they would belong to a Franco -British Union that would never surrender.
[355] The French countryside might be taken, but Britain was resolved to share everything they had to fight together.
[356] The government could now go to London or North Africa, wherever it wished.
[357] France would not be defeated.
[358] He finished his speech by saying he would meet with Churchill tomorrow.
[359] to fix the details.
[360] Renaud allowed the ministers a few minutes so the grand magnitude of this proposal could sink into their tired minds.
[361] He waited and waited, but there was still only silence.
[362] Someone eventually spoke up and curtly rejected the idea.
[363] A majority of the room agreed.
[364] Then someone followed this up with the opinion that France would be nothing more than a part of the British Empire.
[365] And what good would that do them if Britain was conquered in a few weeks anyways, like everyone knew they would be?
[366] Away from the meeting, Vegard was waiting and seething.
[367] He had heard about the Union idea through a tap on the Premier's phone.
[368] To go from a republic to being owned by a republic was the exact opposite direction France needed to be going.
[369] The French ship of state needed a strong single hand at the helm.
[370] Back in the room, Renaud could not believe the unsmiling, unrelieved faces staring at him.
[371] He wanted to scream at them.
[372] Was British dominion worse than German domination?
[373] But since most believed Britain was next, the question would have held no logic for them.
[374] Renaud lost control of the conversation, so the question of asking for terms for an armistice was brought up again.
[375] Renaud instinctively fought back, but he no longer had any fight left in him.
[376] He was so very tired.
[377] and disappointed.
[378] Mandel tried to take over from his premier by saying, the question is really quite simple.
[379] There are those who want to fight and others who do not want to.
[380] And although a true statement, Mandel received no support.
[381] It was now 6 p .m. and there was still no decision.
[382] Then a telegram from General Georges at the front came in to Vegard and he sent it to the president and not Renaud as he should have.
[383] It informed the president and the cabinet that the troops were falling apart or being encircled everywhere.
[384] Food was lacking for the army and very soon would be for the people.
[385] It ended by saying, absolutely necessary to take decision.
[386] Of course, by decision, Georges meant the armistice.
[387] But even this did not bring their meeting to a conclusion.
[388] Rather, the meeting just sort of petered out.
[389] Renaud stunned.
[390] did not continue the conversation about the Franco -British Union, nor did he ask for a count of hands about the armistice.
[391] Nothing happened.
[392] Again.
[393] Renaud, being all too human, especially since fighting the Germans and his own generals for weeks, simply asked for an adjournment so he could talk to the President.
[394] They would reconvene in two hours' time at 10 p .m. Unfortunately, we've come to another point.
[395] where one cannot truthfully tell what was said by the Premier to the President or by the President to the Premier.
[396] One possibility was that Renault expressed his opinion to the President that he felt he was in the minority now.
[397] The President agreed it seemed this way.
[398] Another was that the President convinced the Premier he was now in the minority.
[399] But ironically, what most members of the Cabinet said after the war was because Renault informed them, if rather brusquely, that since Britain would not allow them, to sound out the Germans on conditions for an armistice.
[400] Most of them were of the mind that the fight should continue, and they were ready to vote that way.
[401] However, Renault was so worn down by now that he could not see it, only that the Union proposal that he had hung all his hopes on was shot down so ignominiously.
[402] So, the truth will never be known who first claimed that Renault was in the minority when he was not, and how the other official in the room was convinced of the same.
[403] According to Renaud, written after the war, he said he felt that the president was for the armistice and that Lebrun asked him to go along with the majority, i .e. to ask for the terms of an armistice.
[404] But then the conversation became momentous, but simultaneously clouded.
[405] Renaud then said he told the president, quote, to carry out that policy, go and ask Marshal Pétain, end quote.
[406] But he would spend the rest of his life denying that he gave Lebrun...
[407] Pétain's name as his successor.
[408] Whether Pétain's name was mentioned or not, in order for a new government to be assembled, the president had to call in and confer with the presidents of the two chambers.
[409] Since it was well known that, and I don't know how to say this name, Jeannine, president of the Senate, and Eriot, speaker of the chamber, were against the armistice, Renaud held out a sliver of hope that they would reject Pétain and Renaud would be asked to form another cabinet.
[410] but this time naming men he knew would support him and his cause to keep France in the fight and honoring their agreement with Great Britain.
[411] So the two men came to the president while Renault was in the room.
[412] The president immediately started explaining to the two experienced, respected men that Renault refused to carry out the wishes of the majority of the cabinet by asking for an armistice and was resigning.
[413] Renault concurred with this information.
[414] Both men expressed a desire to keep Renault at the helm.
[415] but he reaffirmed he would not ask for the armistice.
[416] The president then asked the men, who should lead?
[417] They replied, that's your affair.
[418] So much for the two respected, venerable men of great experience helping their country in a time of need.
[419] And of course, no one agrees on what was said next.
[420] Lebrun asked the men for their opinion of Pétain forming a government.
[421] They gave the president no strong opinion either way, but everyone knew they were against Pétain becoming a premier.
[422] So why didn't they say so?
[423] We will never know.
[424] Again, Lebrun said he never considered putting Pétain in charge until Renaud put the idea in his head.
[425] Of course, many of the characters in the story would spend the rest of their lives claiming and reclaiming what they said and didn't say.
[426] According to the president, Renaud said, Call on Pétain.
[427] He has, I'm told, his cabinet list in his pocket.
[428] So the president thought, well, if everyone thinks Patin is the man we need, then that's the way to go.
[429] After all, the marshal has his honor, too.
[430] But what makes this story even stranger was that the president was extremely limited in what he could do.
[431] He could not threaten to keep Renault on his premier, but with conditions.
[432] Nor did he have to take Renault's advice in naming another premier, if Renault did give him Patin's name.
[433] Just before 10 p .m., the ministers were outside of the president's room.
[434] They all assumed that they would soon be voting finally on the armistice.
[435] Just then, Renaud opened the door and came out to meet them.
[436] Before they could say anything, he said, Marshal Pétain is forming a government.
[437] And then he left.
[438] Suddenly, against all tradition and custom, the ministers were no longer ministers.
[439] They had been a part of the Renaud cabinet, but he had just stepped down.
[440] Normally the cabinet would have discussed something as weighty as this, but there would be no discussion.
[441] It was all over.
[442] Soon the president came out and told everyone that there would be no 10 o 'clock meeting, but he asked everyone to stay nearby.
[443] Marshal Pétain would be forming a new cabinet soon, and the president wanted everyone to witness it and be united.
[444] So Pétain was quickly summoned, and by 11 p .m., he was alone with the president.
[445] Le Bras said, well now, form a government.
[446] Straight away, Pétain reached into his briefcase and pulled out a list.
[447] There is my government.
[448] The president was relieved that at least one thing tonight was running smoothly.
[449] Near the top of the list were Pierre Laval and Camille Chautam.
[450] Another name on the list was Raphael Albert.
[451] Though not mentioned here previously, he was another royalist with his mind still in the 17th century.
[452] He would finally get his revenge on the republic as well.
[453] These men and others would be ruling whatever was left of unoccupied France.
[454] Next time...
[455] Pétain's government will quickly ask Germany for an armistice, without mentioning terms of any kind.
[456] For the French, their dark time was just beginning.
[457] There would be French Nazi sympathizers and French resistors, and they would all have to answer for their actions after the war.
[458] Churchill, trying to survive another body blow, knew he needed a representative for those French who still wanted to resist.
[459] Renaud and Mandel would not leave France.
[460] But then, their Prime Minister remembered the little -known but always combative, newly -made Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle.
[461] Welcome to True Spies.
[462] The podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time.
[463] Suddenly out of the dark it's appeared in love.
[464] You'll meet the people who live life undercover.
[465] What do they know?
[466] What are their skills?
[467] And what would you do in their position?
[468] Vengeance felt good.
[469] Seeing these people pay for what they'd done felt righteous.
[470] True Spies from Spyscape Studios.
[471] Wherever you get your podcasts.