Soleimani's Iran

[0] Christian nationalists want to turn America into a theocracy, a government under biblical rule.

[1] If they gain more power, it could mean fewer rights for you.

[2] I'm Heath Drusin, and on the new season of Extremely American, I'll take you inside the movement.

[3] Listen to Extremely American from Boise State Public Radio, part of the NPR network.

[4] America, 11A, try to call.

[5] The cocktail is not answering their phone.

[6] Our number one is in staff and our five.

[7] On an airplane, that's an hijack.

[8] 456 -865.

[9] We have a, I believe, it is a Boeing 757.

[10] Can you see him up there, sir?

[11] That's concerned.

[12] It looks like he's wrong in his wing.

[13] In the tragedy of that moment, for those of us who paid attention to Iran, there was this glimmer of hope that both the United States and Iran are adversaries of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which was hosting al -Qaeda.

[14] So it seemed like there was this natural convergence of interest.

[15] And by all accounts, Iran played a quite constructive role in cooperating with the U .S. and the campaign to get rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

[16] This is Karim Sajat -Poor.

[17] A senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and adjunct professor at Georgetown.

[18] Until 2001, Iran was boxed in.

[19] It was isolated and surrounded by...

[20] enemies.

[21] On the east side, the enemy was the Taliban regime.

[22] On the western side, Baghdad and Saddam Hussein's regime.

[23] The terrorist attacks of September 11th of 2001 changed that situation completely.

[24] Because the U .S. would soon go after both of Iran's enemies.

[25] The Revolutionary Guard welcomed the development.

[26] The Revolutionary Guard is a military arm of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

[27] It's also called the IRGC.

[28] And there were secret meetings in Geneva.

[29] The IRGC intelligence officers handed over maps and exact locations of Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan to American representatives for which American representatives were very thankful because American intelligence presence at the time in Afghanistan was very limited.

[30] This is Ali Al -Fone.

[31] He's a senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute.

[32] He's been researching the Revolutionary Guard for years, And he wrote the book on the topic called, Do you believe it or not?

[33] I don't remember it right now.

[34] I don't know.

[35] Iran unveiled?

[36] Yes, yes.

[37] Iran unveiled.

[38] I never liked the title of the book.

[39] That's why I don't.

[40] There was this hope in the air that maybe there's finally an opportunity for U .S. Iran rapprochement.

[41] You know, many Iranians were hopeful about that.

[42] But the good vibes, you know, between the two changed completely.

[43] when President Bush delivered his so -called axis of evil speech.

[44] In which he put Iran, North Korea, and Iraq lumped him as part of one axis of evil.

[45] States like these and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.

[46] That only confirmed the already very cynical worldview of Iran's hardliners that cooperation with the United States.

[47] States is futile.

[48] The Iranian side and the Revolutionary Guard, they felt betrayed.

[49] They felt they had played a constructive role in helping to get rid of the Taliban.

[50] In their own opinion, they had helped the United States.

[51] And they were rewarded by being placed in the axis of evil.

[52] At that time, the Revolutionary God and the political leadership in the Islamic Republic decided that President Bush could not be trusted and the United States was a very, very serious threat.

[53] They also believed that it was about time to impose some losses on the United States.

[54] That became reality after 2003 where the United States also invaded Iraq.

[55] Let me say this to all Iraqis who are listening.

[56] The regime is not telling the truth.

[57] There are no negotiations taking place with anyone in the Saddam Hussein's regime.

[58] There will be no outcome to this war that leaves Saddam Hussein and his regime in power.

[59] Let there be no doubt.

[60] Many of the greatest advocates of the Iraq war believe that this would be a project to democratize the entire Middle East.

[61] And that's going to immediately delegitimize the Iranian regime.

[62] It's going to delegitimize the theocracy in Iran.

[63] And so if you're Qasem Soleimani, And Ayatollah Khomeini, you think to yourself, we will do everything in our power to make sure that the U .S. war in Iraq is a colossal failure.

[64] The U .S. airstrike has killed Iran's most important military commander.

[65] The targeted killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani.

[66] I think Americans have to understand how significant a figure that Soleimani was in Iran.

[67] This is the night Iran struck back for the death of...

[68] In last night's missile launch, Iran targeted two bases that are key to U .S. operations in the region.

[69] Ukrainian passenger plane has a crash.

[70] Iran now admitting it's shot down a Ukrainian passenger plane by mistake.

[71] You're listening to ThruLine from NPR.

[72] Where we go back in time?

[73] To understand the present.

[74] By now, you've probably heard the name Qasem Soleimani many times in the news.

[75] When he was assassinated, he suddenly became a household name in America.

[76] But for people in Iran, his name is not new.

[77] Soleimani was arguably the most important member of the Revolutionary Guard, which has been fighting direct and proxy wars in the Middle East for 40 years.

[78] It was designated a terrorist organization by the State Department in 2019, but that label doesn't capture its complexity or its immense power.

[79] The Revolutionary Guard and Qasem Soleimani embodied both sides of the Islamic Republic of Iran's identity.

[80] On the one hand, they position themselves as the only power in the Muslim world resisting American imperialism.

[81] And on the other, they behave cynically and try to dominate the affairs of the Middle East at any human cost.

[82] In this episode, we're going to explore the origins of the IRGC and the story of Qasem Soleimani to understand exactly what their impact has been on the Iran -US relationship.

[83] This is May I am from Iran, and you're listening to Surulani.

[84] from NPR.

[85] Support for this podcast and the following message come from WISE, the app that makes managing your money in different currencies easy.

[86] With Wise, you can send and spend money internationally at the mid -market exchange rate.

[87] No guesswork and no hidden fees.

[88] Learn more about how Wise could work for you at Wise .com.

[89] Part 1.

[90] The Goat Dief.

[91] This is the sound of you.

[92] of Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, leading prayers at the funeral of Gassim Soleimani.

[93] This moment perfectly illustrates the impact of Soleimani's death.

[94] Here you have the most powerful person in the country, the Middle East's longest -running autocrat, weeping openly because one of his soldiers has died.

[95] But he wasn't just any soldier.

[96] He was the head of Iran's Al -Quds Force, which is the intelligence arm of the Revolutionary Guard, established after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, when Iran's, King, the Shah, was dramatically overthrown by a mass movement supporting the cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini.

[97] Ayatollah, do you know yourself whether your followers are armed?

[98] They have told me that they are getting prepared and I have given the permission to prepare themselves.

[99] Which means getting armed.

[100] The Revolutionary Guards were essentially set up in the immediate aftermath of the revolution because the Shah's military, which Ayatollah Khomeini inherited with the revolution, he was inherently mistrustful of them because he said, these are not my men.

[101] These were men who were trained by the Shah's government.

[102] And so like most authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, they were extremely paranoid about the prospect of a coup.

[103] and for that reason they set up this initially rag -tag group of men and they called the Guardians of the Revolution, Sepoye Posterone Engolab, to be the protectors of the revolution.

[104] And even if you look at the name of the institution, the exact and word -by -word translation is the army of the guardians of the Islamic Revolution.

[105] In other words, the name Iran is not even mentioned.

[106] in the name of the organization and in the logo of the organization there is a picture of the globe not a map of Iran.

[107] So clearly, this group of Iranian revolutionaries perceive their own organizations as the vanguard of an internationalist revolution.

[108] Waddad in the tariff that, in a world of state, this is Gassim Soleimani's speaking.

[109] But Vahedatat, Piramun and Usul, When he was one of the most of the most powerful way of itte -of -be -ufted, when he died, he was one of the most powerful and well -known people in the Middle East.

[110] But his story starts the exact opposite way it ended, in complete obscurity.

[111] He was born the son of landless peasants who left school after only five years of schooling.

[112] left the village mountain of Rabor, goes to Kermann and begins working as a construction worker.

[113] There is no record of Mr. Soleimani being a revolutionary activist prior to the Revolution of 79.

[114] After the Revolution of 79, he appears to have joined the local branch of the Revolutionary God Corps in Kermon.

[115] At that time, we are not aware of his ideological beliefs, but there is one thing that we know in the immediate aftermath of the revolution.

[116] And it is that many of them more or less lost their belief in the clerical class.

[117] They believed in Khomein, yes, as a spiritual leader and as a leader of the revolution.

[118] But most of the other members of the clerical class they completely distrusted.

[119] And the reason for that is that Revolutional God officers, they were taken out and recruited to serve as personal bodyguards to the clerics.

[120] As personal bodyguards, they had to live physically under the same roof as members of the clergy.

[121] And when you live with people, you find out that not everyone wearing a cloak and a turban is a saint.

[122] You find out that someone who from the pulpit of the mosque is preaching against drinking alcohol, perhaps enjoys a drink at home.

[123] Somebody who is raiding against homosexuality may be interested in handsome young men at home.

[124] So the sanctity of the clerical class completely came down crashing.

[125] So instead of being overtly anti -clerical, the IRGC officer corps, including Mr. Soleimani, they developed an ideology which mixed Shia Islam and Persian nationalism, Iranian nationalism.

[126] So in that sense, they managed to combine the two.

[127] And this combination was so unbelievably potent that it managed to mobilize millions of Iranians.

[128] When Gossam Soleimani joined the Revolutionary Guards, he was very young, only in his early 20s, but he still managed to impress his commanders enough to get an important task, one that probably had an impact on him for the rest of his life.

[129] One of his earliest assignments was to go quell a Kurdish rebellion in northwest Iran.

[130] Because at the time there was an anti -government uprising in Kurdistan.

[131] And if you see the photographs of...

[132] that rebellion, they are incredibly violent.

[133] Approximately 10 ,000 Kurds died during that period, and I think that that was his baptism into that kind of career.

[134] He saw terrible things with his own eyes, and perhaps he also engaged in acts which are difficult to defend morally.

[135] But at the time, it was perceived as necessity in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Iran.

[136] Immediately after that came the heroic phase of the Revolutionary Guards' history in Iran, and that is the war with Iraq.

[137] In 1980, Saddam Hussein invaded southwestern Iran, and the Revolutionary Guard forces were some of the first to respond.

[138] In the frontline cities, Iranian troops hurried to engage the invaders.

[139] Local resistance was led by Iran's Revolutionary Guards, who were fiercely loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini.

[140] What was initially this small rag -tag group of men mushroomed into thousands of men.

[141] They relied heavily on rifles and rocket -propelled grenades and in sporadic engagements exacted a heavy toll of the invading forces.

[142] From their example, stemmed the Iranian mood of self -sacrifice in a holy war.

[143] Iraq, you know, in the beginning of the war, was occupying some of Iran's most important oil -producing areas.

[144] If Iran lost the land to Iraq, the entire country would collapse.

[145] Even though the Iranian side was outgunned, they were able to push Iraq's military back to its borders in two years.

[146] To those who are sitting in the house of God, standing up against the enemies of God, To those who are sitting in the house of God, standing up against the enemies of God, I will kiss your hands and shoulders, because the hands of God are above you.

[147] Gossam Soleimani became a revolutionary guard commander and began to build his reputation as a brave warrior.

[148] This is the commander who would be talking personally to all men that are under his command.

[149] before each attack.

[150] And we are talking about the war, which most of all resembles World War I. It was trench warfare.

[151] You had at least 250 ,000 Iranians being killed in that war.

[152] He wasn't this commander who would sit in a bunker in Tehran and order people around.

[153] He liked to go out there in war zones and appear to be a man of the people.

[154] And here you have one commander, a young man from Kermon, doing reconnaissance missions.

[155] behind enemy lines to minimize the risk for men under his command.

[156] And I'm really emphasizing this because most of the people from Kerman, they were in the same division and many of them were actually personal friends and sometimes family members of Mr. Soleimani.

[157] On one occasion, Radio Baghdad, which was transmitting programs in Persian language, made Mr. Soleimani a minor celebrity of the war.

[158] because on one particular occasion when Mr. Soleimani was doing a reconnaissance mission this young peasant sees a goat and he steals the goat brings the goat back and prepares kebab for his men and Radio Baghdad apparently heard of this story and began propagating the name Soleimani the goat thief I'm going to beheeshra hissed.

[159] I really with the whole of my With all that our war was from behestians, which behastakishan would.

[160] It was.

[161] With all my soul and belief, I believe our war was full of those blessed souls who the heavens were ecstatic to meet.

[162] Soleimani the Gotteef went on to fight for the entirety of the Iran -Iraq war, with almost no leave, repeatedly committing acts of bravery.

[163] By 1988, when the war ended, he was widely considered to be a war hero.

[164] He had this charisma which really engendered enormous loyalty and affection.

[165] And even after the war ended, he didn't, like many revolutionary guardsmen then just enter the private sector and try to go off and get rich.

[166] Like his entire life was the revolution and projecting Iranian power.

[167] At the end of the war, Suleimani was sent back to his home province, Kermann, where he became the chief of the local Revolutionary Guard Force.

[168] Kermon province is close to the Afghan and Pakistani border, and at the time in the 1990s, many Afghan and Iranian drug cartels were operating in those areas, transporting particularly opium from Afghanistan to Iran and from Iran to the international market.

[169] Mr. Soleimani became heavily involved in the fight against the drug cartels, later when Iran and Afghanistan, you know, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, were almost on the brink of a war.

[170] The Quds force was looking for a new face, for a new command.

[171] And because Afghanistan was the primary threat to Iran's national security, the regime needed an Afghanistan expert.

[172] And Mr. Soleimani was one of those people.

[173] So that was the reason why he became the chief commander of the Quds Force.

[174] Qasem Soleimani in the course of two decades had gone from a completely unknown construction worker to the head of Iran's most important intelligence military organization.

[175] But this was only the first half of his rise because just three years into his tenure as the head of Al -Quds Force, 9 -11 happened.

[176] He found himself right in the middle of the action, helping shape Iran's response to an incredibly difficult foreign policy challenge.

[177] And in the process, he showed a more cynical, deadly face to the world.

[178] I'm calling from Houston, Texas.

[179] And you're listening through line, the NPR.

[180] Rumpteen and Rund, I love y 'all.

[181] You make sitting in Houston traffic way more enjoyable.

[182] Thanks.

[183] On the TED Radio Hour, MIT psychologist Sherry Turkle, her latest research into the intimate relationships people are having with chatbots.

[184] Technologies that say, I care about you.

[185] I love you.

[186] I'm here for you.

[187] Take care of me. The pros and cons of artificial intimacy.

[188] That's on the TED Radio Hour from NPR.

[189] Part 2.

[190] Gospel of Chaos.

[191] After Iran fell out with the U .S. in Afghanistan, they caught a break.

[192] A strange opportunity presented itself.

[193] When the Taliban government collapsed, many members of al -Qaeda fled Afghanistan and crossed the border into Iran.

[194] They were quickly arrested and interrogated by Iranian intelligence.

[195] And at that time, there was a debate within Iran about whether these Sunni jihadists were a threat to Shiite Iran or whether they were an asset.

[196] There were bin Laden family members.

[197] There was a guy who later went on to become the leader of al -Qaeda in Iraq, Zadkawi.

[198] And I think Qasem Soleimani was unique.

[199] That was kind of his sinner genius in thinking, you know what?

[200] We can potentially use these folks.

[201] And Soleimani assigned two Revolutionary Guard commanders to essentially tend to their needs.

[202] They were given televisions.

[203] They were given money to build a library.

[204] Their families were taken out on shopping outings.

[205] One of the most notorious al -Qaeda explosives experts.

[206] A guy who's still alive, he's still on the run, Seif al -Adul.

[207] He had access to this very posh gym in North Tehran in a neighborhood called Elahia, where he used to swim laps alongside foreign diplomats.

[208] And, you know, the children of Osama bin Laden affectionately called Qasem Soleimani, Hajj Qasem.

[209] They used to break bread together.

[210] My friend Siamak was tortured in prison who was in solitary confinement and it really angers me to think that hardened jihadis, you know, al -Qaeda members were treated as guests in Iran and real patriots who love their country are treated like criminals and put into solitary confinement and exiled.

[211] And I think that history is not going to reflect well on Qasem Soleimani when his biographies are written in the future.

[212] Now that Soleimani had these Al -Qaeda fighters on his side, he had to figure out exactly how to use them.

[213] The way they figure out to do that initially is by taking these Al -Qaeda jihadists and simply unleash them into Iraq.

[214] With the understanding that you guys, go do what you do, go after the United States.

[215] United States, car bombings, suicide bombings.

[216] And just a few months into the war, August of 2003, Abu Musa al -Zarqawi, the Jordanian al -Qaeda leader, he sets off these three major bombs, which essentially destroys the American experiment in Iraq in its infancy.

[217] One bomb hit the Jordanian embassy, another hit the United Nations, which reduced their peacekeeping presence there.

[218] And lastly, Zarqawi conducted this car bombing against the major Shiite shrine, Imam Ali Mosque in Najat.

[219] This was unheard of at the time that someone would go set off a car bombing at a mosque during Friday prayers.

[220] This totally radical, the Shiite community in Iraq.

[221] And it essentially pushed them into the arms of Iran and Qasem Soleimani, who said to the Shi 'ads of Iraq, we can protect you.

[222] You know, there's some slight parallels here with the way the United States fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, because the United States also supported these Mojaheadin, you know, essentially the jihadists of day to go fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, obviously not realizing that those folks would be the antecedents of al -Qaeda.

[223] Different conflict, same strategy.

[224] And you never understand until years later what is going to be the residual impact of these choices.

[225] Soleimani didn't just use Sunni extremists to cause chaos in Iraq.

[226] He also used Iran's money and influence to organize militias among his felt.

[227] Shiites in southern Iraq.

[228] It managed to use the Iraqi Shia militias who should be thankful to the United States military because the U .S. had overthrown Saddam's regime, but the Islamic Republic managed to mobilize them against the United States.

[229] It served the interests of the Islamic Republic to maintain Iraq in a state of controlled chaos and anarchy so that the United States could not declare itself the winner of developments in Iraq.

[230] How does Ali or anyone else know this?

[231] Well, one Iraqi Shia fighter while being interrogated by American military intelligence explained exactly how he worked with Iran.

[232] He would go to Tehran.

[233] He would receive bags of money, approximately $700 ,000 to up to a $1 million, to form a group of fighters in Iraq.

[234] Al -Quds Force funded, equipped, and even trained Iraqi Shia militias on how to ambush and attack vulnerable American forces.

[235] One of their most effective tactics was teaching Shia fighters how to use IEDs.

[236] Improvised explosive devices, which proved to be very effective in getting through metal tanks and maiming and killing, injuring U .S. troops.

[237] At the very minimum, 600 American servicemen were killed in those years.

[238] U .S. officials hold Soleimani directly responsible for conceiving of that.

[239] And that's why you have, you know, one, if not two generations of American military forces, whom if you were to ask them, who is your worst adversary in the world?

[240] The person you see is the greatest threat to the United States.

[241] And even when Osama bin Laden was living and Baghdadi was living, they would have still said Qasem Soleimani.

[242] Soleimani believed that by imposing heavy losses on the United States military in Iraq, that it was possible to target the psychology of the American society.

[243] Every single time an American is coming home in a body bag, it would have an impact on willingness and support of the American public to preserve a sizable United States military presence in Iraq.

[244] and in some ways it worked.

[245] American public support for the war in Iraq waned as the conflict became more costly in lives and money.

[246] Slowly, the American presence in Iraq began to shrink.

[247] By 2011, the number of American soldiers there was a fraction of what it was just five or six years earlier.

[248] Emboldened by their success and fearing the downfall of allies in the Middle East, the Revolutionary Guard, with Gossim Soleimani leading the way, began to make moves.

[249] beyond Iraq.

[250] On NPR, where the past is omnipresent.

[251] Part 3.

[252] A String of Pearls.

[253] At least 20 protesters have been killed during marches in several Syrian cities.

[254] It's estimated that up to a million people have taken to the streets to challenge President Bashar al -Assad's rule.

[255] Protesters demanded the end of the regime, ripping down a statue of the president's father, bracing to see the president's father.

[256] reaction of heavily armed government security forces.

[257] The answer came quickly and violently.

[258] Here they are.

[259] Members of the elite revolutionary guards on the front lines of Syria's civil movement.

[260] The Islamic Republic perceives Syria as a bridgehead connecting Western Afghanistan to Iran, to Iraq, to Lebanon.

[261] Mr. Rafsanjani, the former president, he referred to this as a string of perils.

[262] If one of them collapses, it's going to cause very serious trouble for the rest of the system.

[263] And the strategic thinking of Mr. Raft Sanjani was shared by the leadership of the Revolutionary God, and Bashar al -Assad had to be defended at all costs, at all cost.

[264] Not because they liked Bashar al -Assad, we criticized him as a matter of fact, but they believe that collapse of the Bashar regime and emergence of a different type of regime, it would be bad for Iran.

[265] So the Islamic Republic began systematically to send first Guz force officers, then deployed Lebanese Hezbollah, who did so rather unwillingly, because Hezbollah's raison d 'etre is to protect Arabs against Israel, but here they are going to kill fellow Arabs in Syria.

[266] So it was very embarrassing for Hezbollah, but they also felt that they had no choice.

[267] This is a jabhi that we're going to be jambhi, like, forz, the doleet of Syria in front of the Syria is, not, what any thing is this is.

[268] I mean, many of the people, who are in Syria, jibhah al -Qaeda in Syria, jebhahy al -Qud soldier, serving as an advisor to the Syrian military, talking about the opposition to Bashar al -Assad.

[269] He says that it isn't a war between the Syrian people and their government.

[270] It's a war between good and evil, between Shias from Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq, against Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

[271] This one of the people of Iran, Hezbollah has, Mojaheadine Araqi are and other Mojahedine Afghansi and they're coming.

[272] Jebhaun who is Israel?

[273] Jebh who is Arabistan?

[274] Javeh who is Turkey?

[275] This man was likely reporting to Qasem Soleimani who was tasked with coordinating and organizing the defense of Bashar al -Assad's regime.

[276] He did this at a time when Assad's military was using chemical weapons against its own.

[277] own citizens and bombing rebellious Syrian towns indiscriminately, killing combatants and civilians alike.

[278] Despite all of this extreme violence, Syrian rebels and citizens were still gaining ground, and things were not looking good for Soleimani's military.

[279] After a few years, they were suffering so many losses that the Islamic Republic had to deploy other Shia militia groups in Syria.

[280] For example, We are Afghans from the Fatimian division, different Iraqi militias who were already busy fighting the civil war in Iraq.

[281] Some of them were also sent fighting in the civil war in Syria.

[282] And at some point, of course, they were so desperate that Major General Soleimani had to travel to Moscow and ask Vladimir Putin for military support because they needed air support.

[283] And after that, things began to go very well for the Revolutionary Guard.

[284] The Revolutionary Guard commanders, they genuinely believe that Syria was a sensational success story.

[285] They won against all odds.

[286] While Damascus remains a target for armed groups in the region, local residents are without doubt.

[287] Bashar al -Assad has won the war.

[288] Of course we won the war, no one can argue with that.

[289] And as long as our president is in power, Everything will be fine in Syria.

[290] The war in Syria not only provided the Revolutionary Guard with an opportunity to achieve military success on the ground, but unfortunately also gave them the opportunity to compromise themselves ethically and morally.

[291] The United Nations has found massive evidence pointing to the Syrian government's involvement in war crimes and crimes against humanity.

[292] Syrian activists have accused the forces of President Bashar al -Assad of killing hundreds of people in a nerve gas attack.

[293] The accusation goes to the highest levels and implicates the president Bashar al -Assad.

[294] They are accomplices of Bashar al -Assad's regime use of chemical weapons against the Syrian population.

[295] They're accomplices of the Syrian regime using famine against his own population as a means of controlling them.

[296] In 2014, after years of fighting in Syria, Syria and Iraq, Qasem Soleimani and the Quds Force all of a sudden had a new problem.

[297] ISIS.

[298] And there's a logical question here.

[299] If Iran had been able to work with Al -Qaeda, then why couldn't they just support ISIS?

[300] Well, Al -Qaeda was a little different than ISIS.

[301] Al -Qaeda was not out gratuitously beheading Shiites the way that ISIS was doing for the Iranian regime, ISIS was just beyond the pale.

[302] Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guard Corps perceived this as a serious threat which could take away all their gains from them.

[303] ISIS posed a real threat to Iran's Shiite allies in Iraq.

[304] At some point, Islamic State was threatening Baghdad.

[305] At the same time, I would argue that both Iran and the Assad regime in Syria actually utilized the Sunni jihadists.

[306] Presence of such an inhumane enemy, universally condemned as a terrorist organization, it was not such a bad thing from the Iranian side.

[307] Because the Islamic Republic, which had adhered to, difficulties explaining and legitimizing its military actions in Iraq and Syria, suddenly had a legitimate cause to engage in the fight, against terrorism.

[308] On those occasions, just as it did before, you know, in 2001, in Afghanistan, the United States and the Islamic Republic cooperated with each other.

[309] The United States Air Force was providing air cover to the Quds Force operatives and Mr. Soleimani personally so that he could cleanse the city of the Citi of the Sunni radical elements and Islamic State.

[310] At that time, in 2014 and 15, the Quds Force and Mr. Soleimani, both of them were on the list of designated terrorists of the United States government.

[311] So you clearly see strange badfellows at times of war.

[312] And this is the moment when Qasem Soleimani became internationally known.

[313] The Revolutionary Guard knew his appeal.

[314] His face was put on posters.

[315] Camera crews followed him as he visited soldiers in Syria.

[316] Music was made about him.

[317] And all the way up to his death a few weeks.

[318] ago, he was successfully marketed.

[319] As kind of this Shiaid Che Guevara.

[320] This is footage of Qasem Soleimani speaking to Al -Quds Force in Syria.

[321] Arabic is actually pretty good.

[322] And this is a song in Arabic made to honor him.

[323] The late Major General Soleimani was a man with at least two faces.

[324] One face, that is the face of a young man who left his little village to go to the front, to defend Iran against the invading Iraqi army in 1980.

[325] That very same individual, of course, also had another face.

[326] That face is the face, of a general who cynically attacked and killed American servicemen in Iraq since 2003 and also, most unfortunately, engaged or was complicit in war crimes in Iraq and also in Syria.

[327] These two faces show the complexity of the individual.

[328] I respect the first one.

[329] the war hero, but of course I condemn the other face, which is that of a war criminal.

[330] And I think I have a somewhat different perspective here than many analysts of Iranian origin because not only did I live in Iran, but I also lived in Beirut, and I would travel every couple weeks to Damascus for a year.

[331] And so when I see the destruction of Syria, these numbers are not just a statistic for me, 13 million people displaced, you know, 600 ,000 people killed.

[332] I see Qasem Soleimani as being directly complicit and that horrific violence.

[333] This is frankly my problem with a lot of Iranians who comment on this because I feel like they totally lack a self -awareness about, you know, they only view them in this Iranian context and they don't give a shit about the role he played elsewhere in the region.

[334] And I tell people, how would you feel as an Iranian?

[335] to watch millions of Iraqis mourning Saddam Hussein.

[336] A lot of people commented about Soleimani was that he was soft -spoken.

[337] He wasn't someone who was like this fire -breathing radical.

[338] And I'm always reminded of this Persian saying about the clerics that if you look at the hands of the mullahs of the clerics, the dusts of the ahundah to be, you know, that he's not done, car not did they're in their own.

[339] Their hands are always like perfectly manicured as if they haven't done any manual labor in their life or even known war.

[340] They talk a tough game, but they've never served in conflict.

[341] And I always think that's probably one reason why Suleiman, it was soft -spoken.

[342] You know, he didn't need to breathe rhetorical fire because everyone knew he had his elbows deep in blood.

[343] That's it for this week's show.

[344] I'm Randa Abd al -Fattah.

[345] I'm Ramtin Arablui.

[346] And you've been listening to ThruLine from NPR.

[347] This episode was produced by me and me and Jamie York.

[348] Lawrence Wu.

[349] Lane Kaplan Levinson.

[350] Lou Olkowski.

[351] Nigeri Eaton.

[352] Fact -checking for this episode was done by Kevin Vocal.

[353] Thanks also to Anya Grunman, Aida Porasad, and Austin Horn.

[354] Our music was composed by Ramtin and his band, Drop Electric.

[355] If you'd like something you heard or you have an idea for an episode, please write us at ThruLine at NPR .org.

[356] Or hit us up on Twitter at ThruLine.

[357] NPR.

[358] Also, we love your help with an upcoming episode.

[359] Tell us what does astrology mean to you?

[360] And what's your sign?

[361] Let us know by leaving us a voicemail at 872 -58 -88 -8 -805.

[362] And you might just hear yourself on our show.

[363] That number again is 872 -58 -88 -8 -805.

[364] Thanks for listening.

[365] Support for NPR and the following message come from the Kauffman Foundation, providing access to opportunities that help people achieve financial stability, upward mobility, and economic prosperity, regardless of race, gender, or geography.

[366] Coffman .org