The History of WWII Podcast XX
[0] Welcome to True Spies, the podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time.
[1] Suddenly out of the dark, it's a bit in love.
[2] You'll meet the people who live life undercover.
[3] What do they know?
[4] What are their skills?
[5] And what would you do in their position?
[6] Vengeance felt good seeing these.
[7] People paid for what they'd done, felt righteous.
[8] True Spies, from Spyscape Studios, wherever you get your podcasts.
[9] This episode is dedicated to Abigail Ayers, whose light will always shine.
[10] This episode is brought to you by Audible.
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[12] Just go to the website, worldwar2podcast .net, and click on the Audible link.
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[16] Today, I would like to recommend two titles as they both cover different aspects of the same event.
[17] The first one is Americans in Paris by Charles Glass.
[18] Before the war came to France in 1940, About 30 ,000 Americans enjoyed all that the Parisian life had to offer.
[19] But when it became clear that the Nazis would make it to the City of Light, most left.
[20] This is the story of the 5 ,000 Americans who remained and what they had to deal with on a daily basis.
[21] The Americans, as neutral, thought they would be safe.
[22] But this was no ordinary war, and the Nazis were no ordinary conquerors.
[23] This book covers an amazing array of Parisian personalities and the remaining Americans and their struggle to live some sort of normal life under Nazi rule.
[24] Once Paris was taken, the German military who entered the city were told to be on their best behavior, at first.
[25] And yes, the reader speaks French and does a beautiful job with the names and the places, unlike yours truly.
[26] The second book is And the Show Went On.
[27] Cultural Life in Nazi Occupied Paris by Alan Riding.
[28] Weeks after Paris was occupied, life slowly began to return to some level of normality.
[29] The new masters of Paris encouraged the operas, the theaters, and nightclubs to reopen, and they did for the rest of the war.
[30] Each artist, whether writer, musician, painter, or movie maker, had to decide for themselves whether to resist, fight, or collaborate.
[31] Picasso painted Sartre wrote no exit, and over 200 movies were made during the occupation.
[32] The war, as far as Paris was concerned, was over.
[33] It now came down to rebuilding some sort of life in the cultural center of Europe.
[34] Finally, the book tries to answer the question that the French would have to live with after the war.
[35] Was collaboration or resistance the norm?
[36] Hello, and thank you for listening to a History of World War II podcast, episode 22, The Fall of France, part 3.
[37] The previous episode covered the fall of Holland, despite its brave fighting, after five days of resistance.
[38] Technology and scientific advances made it possible for the Nazi state.
[39] to obliterate any city within its reach.
[40] After Rotterdam was bombed and more Dutch cities were threatened with the same, the Netherlands surrendered on May 15th to save themselves from annihilation.
[41] During those same five days, the Belgians had suffered unexpected defeats, as in the loss of the supposed fortress of Fort Ibn Amal, as well as having their first line of defense, the Grey Peel line, run over on the first day of battle.
[42] But hope seemed possible as the defensive line along the Dial River, manned by Belgian, French, and British troops, held back the German onslaught.
[43] Technology could work for a better defense as well, it seemed.
[44] Of course, we now know that this hope is what the Germans had counted on when their attack plan was changed in early 1940.
[45] The Allies would put their best men and material where they thought, and the Germans helped them think, the main attack would take place in central Belgium.
[46] Much less thought or concern was given to the rest of the defensive line.
[47] To the south, there was the mighty Maginot line, with the latest guns manned by 40 French divisions.
[48] Connecting this impregnable line with the 1st French Army and the British Expeditionary Force in the north was the equally impenetrable Ardennes Force in Luxembourg and southern Belgium.
[49] To be sure, if the Bosch, a derogative term for the Germans by the French, tried to come this way, the force would hold them up long enough for the French high command to intercept them with enough forces at the Meuse River to turn any hoped -for German dash into a wasteful and therefore losing siege.
[50] No matter that this section was guarded by the fewest, least trained and equipped men in the French army, Was not General Gamla a hero of World War I and respected by the French as well as the Germans for his military experience?
[51] Did the Allies not match the Germans in manpower?
[52] Surely this alone would undermine any plans the would -be invaders had for conquering the four countries.
[53] Luxembourg would not fight, but German troops would have to be stationed there and so deprive men from the front.
[54] General Charles Hunziger of the Second Army just south of Sedan, was known and trusted by General Gamla.
[55] He would do his duty to France.
[56] But General Hunziger seemed to live in his own world at times, and his rank allowed him to force others to live there with him.
[57] On the first day of May, General Hunziger came upon strong tank obstacles along two roads leading from the Ardennes forests.
[58] Although no one believed this is the way the German forces would come in their expected attack on France, a leading officer in the area had obstacles prudently erected there.
[59] Hunsiger, commander of the 2nd French Army and senior officer in the area, ordered them to be taken down as the current defenses in the area, notably along the Meuse River, were deemed by himself adequate.
[60] By May 3rd, the obstacles were completely removed.
[61] When war was first declared between Germany and France in late 1939, France expected to be attacked at any moment.
[62] Germany was less anxious because, firstly, they knew they were not going to attack yet, and secondly, they didn't believe France was in any position to deliver a meaningful offensive.
[63] But then days went by, then weeks, then months, and many, if not most, in France hoped there would be no active war between the two rivals.
[64] Over the months, There had been many warnings that turned out to be false.
[65] Soon it was the old story of the boy who cried wolf.
[66] Life, for the most part, returned to normal for the French people.
[67] The winter of 1939 -40 in France for the citizens was mostly quiet and the spring promised to be beautiful, making Paris, if possible, even more lovely and colorful.
[68] To live in France or to be French meant enjoying culture, the envy of the world.
[69] Music halls were reopened, bookshops and salons got back to their world of exchanging ideas and hopefully moving the human experience forward.
[70] May 9th seemed like all the other spring days before it, and it was common for the entire officer staff of the Army of Ardennes to see a play.
[71] Indeed, 10 -15 % of the enlisted men were on leave.
[72] The play attended by the 2nd Army staff officers was deemed a good one, and the men got back to their beds around 2am.
[73] They were awakened three hours later at 5 a .m. when the attack came on May 10th.
[74] The French High Command was a study in extreme compartmentalization.
[75] General Gamelin, the ranking officer, was at Vincennes on the eastern edge of Paris.
[76] General Georges, Gamelin's second command, had his post 35 miles further to the east.
[77] The General Staff, or Grand General Headquarters, was at a third location.
[78] while the operations, intelligence, personnel, and organization bureaus were divided into two more locations.
[79] Transport and services, a critical function, especially in war, was in another location, but far away from General Georges.
[80] In summation, there were three commands with horrible communications between them.
[81] Gimla, for example, had no radio at his headquarters.
[82] He did have a phone, but he preferred not to call General Georges.
[83] His sense of pride and honor found the idea of having your superior check up on you while you were working distasteful.
[84] Instead, Gamla would drive the 30 -minute trip to talk to Georges when he needed to.
[85] It was later found, after the war, that an order to the Air Force to hit a location or target would take six hours before it made it to the pilot.
[86] Orders from Gamla to the front to deal with a military situation, good or bad, would take even longer.
[87] And finally, there was no love lost between the Generalissimo Gamla and his second -in -command Georges, who would be directing the Gamla plan of defense.
[88] General Gamla's plan of war, submitted to Deladier February 1940, did not mention the Ardennes forest.
[89] As stated already, Gamla allocated his weakest armies, the 9th and the 2nd, to defend it.
[90] But it would turn out that the Meuse front between Namur and Sedan were the Ardennes forest exits.
[91] would host the main German thrust, and if I can be forgiven, I will call this vital river by the English Meuse as opposed to the German Moss, even though they won.
[92] In Gemla's defense, though, even General Halder of the German General Staff thought the trip through the forest would take his panzers all of nine days, but in actuality, it was well -roaded and consisted more of rolling hills than mountainous country.
[93] General Hunziger's partner in defending this part of the defensive line was General André Georges Corap and his 9th Army.
[94] His position would be further west and north of Sedan, helping to connect the Machinon Line with the Dile River in Belgium.
[95] Unfortunately for the Allies, from Namur south to Sedan, many units of the 9th Army were not in position when the war came.
[96] The same went for Hunziger's 2nd Army, south of Sedan.
[97] It's fair to say that the southern end of the dial line was jumbled.
[98] Some troops had to walk and some rode, so the line of defense had gaps where the men were still marching double time to get into place.
[99] When they got there, they were exhausted and found none of the promised fortifications that were to be dug in or built by Belgium during the Phony War.
[100] Finally, most of the anti -Tate gun troops were away with their equipment and training.
[101] Again, on May 9th, there was no rush.
[102] The Panzers were not coming here.
[103] At best, this area would be a secondary theater of the war.
[104] May 10th May 10th, 1940, in Paris would have been remembered for the beautiful weather that day, but reports of the German attack made the bath of sunshine seem surreal.
[105] Fall Gelb called for Guderian's 19th Armor Corps, made up of the 1st, 2nd, and 10th Panzer Divisions, to enter the Luxembourg frontier at 5 .30 a .m., and it was on schedule.
[106] By noon, the advance units were at the Belgian frontier.
[107] These seven divisions of German armor were heading for the Ardennes Forest, supposedly impassable by tanks.
[108] General Gemmler could only wait now that things had come to a head.
[109] But again, he felt good about their chances of stopping the German attack.
[110] But even on the first day of war, his outdated views of battle were already showing.
[111] Because of his view of the planes, the French bombers were not allowed to bomb the Germans, but they were limited only to recon and pursuit.
[112] Gimlach could not bring himself to see fighters and bombers as a part of war.
[113] But because they could give a commander a bird's eye view, they were limited to a tool of information.
[114] perhaps like the observational balloons of the First World War.
[115] So the fighters and bombers did their part and saw long lines of German columns in southern Belgium and Luxembourg.
[116] Of course, the pilots were excited to see such relatively easy targets to drop their bombs on, that is, until they remembered they were only there as the eyes of the French High Command.
[117] Injuries into the log of the Air Force generals were full of comments about the French High Command that are not fit for the clean rating of this podcast.
[118] one that can be shared and gives insight into the reality the French Air Force faced, quotes Gamla by saying, There's no such thing as a battle of the air.
[119] There's only battle of the land.
[120] Only by 11 a .m. were the French released from this rule, but then they were told not to bomb villages or cities.
[121] Since the German columns were traveling through and attacking villages and cities, this order limited the French air ability to hurt the oncoming Germans.
[122] Of course, the Germans were attacking cities and villages at will.
[123] Due to miscommunication and the attitude toward the Air Force, most of the French fighters were not deployed on May 10th, the first day of war.
[124] Strangely, there were more modern planes available at the end of the war than at the beginning.
[125] That mystery was never solved.
[126] But the French officers closed ranks in the face of their historical foe.
[127] The feud between Premier Reynaud and Gimla was set aside.
[128] Only victory mattered.
[129] As Gemmler said, France alone counts.
[130] Prudence in military matters is a must if you wish to survive, much less win.
[131] And with that said, General Hunziger was a prudent man, for the most part.
[132] So according to the defensive plan, on the first day of the German attack, General Hunziger of the 2nd French Army and General Corrapp of the 9th French Army near Sedan sent five light cavalry divisions, each one half -horse, half -tank of their respective armies, across the Meuse River and into the Ardennes Forest to slow up any, though doubted, German attack coming from this direction.
[133] By 2 a .m. of the next morning, General Karab's cavalry force, the 1st and the 4th Light Cavalry Divisions, had gone about 15 to 20 miles inside the forest with no contact.
[134] If Germany decided to sneak infantry through Luxembourg and southern Belgium, They would be in for a surprise.
[135] But further south, within the Ardennes, the 2nd Army Cavalry Corps of Huntingers near Hollande ran into the 10th Panzer Division, was savagely mauled and pushed back.
[136] Unknown to the French at the time, the Belgian troops had standing orders from their Belgian superiors.
[137] When faced with the enemy, Blow any bridges if possible, and instead of falling back to the Meuse to help the French, fall back in a northwesterly direction toward Namur, joining the main Belgian army there.
[138] The weak entente between the French and the Belgian military was starting to show.
[139] Miscommunications amongst the French themselves worked out well in one instance.
[140] Two companies of Cheshire's Ardennes did not get the order to retreat in the face of the enemy.
[141] Instead, they blew up the bridges nearby, piled logs onto the road to block the panzers, and fought.
[142] This independent action held up the 1st Panzer Division most of the day on May 10th.
[143] The French cavalry of the 9th and 2nd Armies, like the Allies, had their own lack of entente.
[144] As the German armor continued to advance through the force on multiple roads, one French unit would come under attack and then withdraw without telling the other cavalry corps nearby, thus exposing their flank.
[145] Once the exposed cavalry corps figured out what happened, they would retreat in kind.
[146] Military necessity demanded this, and soon it turned into the two corps playing reverse leapfrog with each other.
[147] All the while, the Germans kept coming forward.
[148] May 11th, the second day.
[149] The retreating French cavalry corps eventually backed up enough to expose some French infantry that was just outside the forest edge.
[150] Soon there was even less coordination.
[151] amongst the French, and if a few units stood to fight, they suffered very high casualties due to the oncoming German armor and air power.
[152] During all this, the German troops in the Ardennes were amazed at their progress.
[153] At this rate, it was estimated that they would reach the Meuse within 24 hours, in unimaginable strength, once all seven panzer divisions were brought up.
[154] Ironically, the French missed their chance in the Ardennes forest.
[155] Impressive as the number and power of the German armor was, it was confined to the roads until it cleared the woods.
[156] Long, slow -moving lines of armor are a bomber's dream, but it wasn't until May 11th and 12th that the French directed any Allied bombing on the German tanks there.
[157] But even when it came, it was half -heartedly done, because the French High Command still thought that although this situation was troubling, the main attack would come north of here.
[158] Even more importantly, a small number of anti -tank guns could have had a serious effect on the Germans in the Ardennes.
[159] Taking out the leading panzers could have clogged up the narrow roads with wrecked German armor.
[160] But this was not done, and besides the trouble the 1st Panzer Division had, all the other panzers advanced that day on May 11th.
[161] North of Sedan, General Rommel's 7th Panzer Division was able to push the French 4th Cavalry towards the Meuse.
[162] His goal was the town of Dinant.
[163] There he would split his forces and cross the Meuse on both sides of the town.
[164] Just to the north of him was the 5th Panzer Division, protecting his right flank.
[165] If he succeeded, he would then face the French 9th Army under Corap, but then Rommel would be in France.
[166] Between General Rommel and Guderian's 19th Army Corps to the south was the 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions.
[167] Again, all but three of the panzer divisions the Germans had were tied into this operation of punching a hole in the Allied line.
[168] To support the gaps in between the armored divisions, the 32nd German Infantry Division would hopefully tie down any French forces.
[169] All this German armor was heading for the mighty Meuse, from just south of Sedan all the way up to just below Namur.
[170] By evening...
[171] Guderian's 19th Corps of three armored divisions was approaching the Meuse.
[172] The 1st Panzer Division was first to reach the Samoy River, about 10 miles in front of the Meuse.
[173] The 10th Panzer Division reached it next, further south, and finally the 2nd Panzer Division made it to the Samoy just above the 1st Division.
[174] That night, General Karap of the 9th Army ordered his cavalry troops to abandon the Samoy River and move back to the Meuse on the next day.
[175] The defensive line at the Samoy was compromised and could not be held by his forces.
[176] Some dropped back to the Meuse that night instead of waiting for the morrow.
[177] They abandoned forts that had been worked on all the previous winter.
[178] Clearly, something was needed to slow down the German advance, but General Gamla still focused further north, telephoned General d 'Astierre of the Air Force at 4 .30 on May 11th and told him to send all his aircraft north to slow down the German advance coming from the Maastricht toward the Dial Line.
[179] But later that day, General Georges called General d 'Astierre and told him to support the area around the Albert Canal.
[180] Clearly, the French High Command still held on to the belief that the main attack was coming through Belgium.
[181] May 12th, the third day.
[182] The next day, May 12th, General Billot of the 1st Army made General d 'Aster's life and job harder by telling him that the French Air Force should only support the French 7th and 1st Armies and perhaps, if possible, the British Expeditionary Force in the north.
[183] By 4 p .m. on the 12th, The French withdrawal behind the Meuse was complete.
[184] There was some order to it, but doubt was starting to enter the collective mindset of the troops.
[185] Welcome to True Spies.
[186] The podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time.
[187] Suddenly out of the dark it's appeared in Laban.
[188] You'll meet the people who live life undercover.
[189] What do they know?
[190] What are their skills?
[191] And what would you do in their position?
[192] Vengeance felt good.
[193] Seeing these people pay for what they'd done felt righteous.
[194] True Spies from Spyscape Studios.
[195] Wherever you get your podcasts.
[196] Right behind the retreating French, the German armor reached the Meuse that afternoon on an 80 -mile front from Dinant to Sedan.
[197] The armor was a day ahead of schedule, but this being ahead of schedule could have had horrible consequences for the Germans.
[198] Because some units were ahead and some units were sticking to the schedule, there were gaps that could have been exploited.
[199] But the French were not thinking offensively at this point.
[200] They were too busy reeling from the German advance.
[201] General Rommel of the 7th Panzer Division, one of the two of General Hermann Hoth's 15th Armor Corps to the north and west of Sedan, arrived on the east bank of the Meuse that afternoon and noticed through his binoculars that not all areas of the other side of the river had defensive works.
[202] Erwin Rommel's character of always pushing the adversary, would not let him wait for his reinforcements, which would also give the French time to fill in their gaps.
[203] Rommel would take what he had and attack the city of Dinan on the Meuse to the north and south of it.
[204] Because the French had been pushed back only by the German advanced units, they still did not know where the main push would be.
[205] French air units reported long lines of German armor, but no one thought of informing a higher command.
[206] The French, still thinking like World War I, thought the Germans would not attack across the river until they brought forward their infantry and artillery.
[207] This would give the French days to deploy their units in better defensive positions.
[208] To stem the German tide, more French infantry from the French 71st were being brought up.
[209] They finally arrived late that night, but got there by walking for two straight days.
[210] By the time they got there, they were exhausted and not quite sure what positions they should take up.
[211] However, the French had one piece of good news.
[212] All the bridges from Namur to Sedan were destroyed.
[213] If the Germans wanted to cross, they would have to build bridges, and that would allow the French to hit them while they were vulnerable.
[214] Of course, in times of a pending attack, fear and rumors spread throughout the defensive positions.
[215] The fleet's rumor -making rounds was of intact bridges held by 5th colonists, but a special investigation after the war confirmed that all the bridges in the area were indeed destroyed.
[216] As the hours went by on May 12th, more German armor now lined up along their side of the Meuse.
[217] The French were still not fully deployed on the western bank.
[218] But again, the French thought they had days to complete their disposition and still thought the main attack would happen in the north.
[219] General d 'Aster of the Air Force had been trying to tell someone above him that his reconnaissance planes showed the main German armor around Ardennes.
[220] Finally, someone listened.
[221] By 4 p .m. on the 12th, General Georges intervened into the fray to order the Air Force's first priority to be the Second Army.
[222] whose cavalry was falling back to Sedan from the Ardennes.
[223] But General Billot, of the 1st French Army, still wanted two -thirds of the Air Force for northern sections.
[224] This would leave one -third of the Air Force, in his opinion, adequate help for Sedan.
[225] A regiment of French troops was stationed in Sedan itself.
[226] But when the frightened populace fled at the news of German armor was on the other side of the river, the regiment went with it.
[227] No officer tried to check the French withdrawal.
[228] It seems that the commanding officer in the area never considered fighting within Sedan itself.
[229] If properly done, its narrow streets could have delayed the German panzers for days.
[230] That night, General Gransard, the commanding officer of the 10th Corps under Hunsiger, where the main thrust would come, wrote in his diary that while acknowledging that the Germans could come right up to the river, he still felt confident in the next day's fight that would keep them from crossing.
[231] He noted that German tanks could come right up to the river, but not the German infantry and artillery.
[232] The French artillery would push them back if they tried.
[233] He ended his entry with the supposed witty remark that German tanks can't build pontoon bridges.
[234] His confidence in the Allied Air Force was strong.
[235] Of course, he admitted he did not know the strength of the enemy.
[236] Still, he felt cautiously optimistic.
[237] At 3 .30 that day, May 12th, General Hunsiger wired General Georges, telling him of his severe losses of cavalry in the Ardennes.
[238] Georges, being prudent, ordered the French 3rd Armour and three motorized divisions to head towards General Gransard's location at once.
[239] But later that day, Hunsiger felt better about his situation and reported that no urgency was required in sending reinforcements.
[240] General Guderian felt good about the day's gains.
[241] And after talking to his chief, General von Kleist, they agreed that although the Germans were far from ready to attack in the normal sense of having infantry, artillery, and armor with reserves ready, the French were equally not ready to defend.
[242] The incomplete defensive works staring at them across the river convinced them both of the course they should take.
[243] So instead of attacking on May 14th, After adequate forces were brought up, it was decided that the German Air Force would bomb the Meuse defensive positions for the first part of the day, and then the attack would begin at 4 p .m. on May 13th.
[244] Having decided to attack the next day, without the bulk of his forces, General Guderian, back at his headquarters, got to work late that night.
[245] He did not have time to improvise a new detailed plan for his three tank divisions, but looking through his files, he found the perfect war game plan from the previous winner, changed the date on it, and sent it out.
[246] The war game plans he selected were perfect for this situation.
[247] Again, German preparedness and planning was paying off.
[248] Because the remaining story of World War II will concern mainly military matters from here on out, I will be zooming in, as it were, on the movements of the combatants.
[249] I am assuming that this will be what most listeners want to hear and is one of the main reasons for the strange attraction of World War II.
[250] In order to be able to appreciate the upcoming battle, think of the section of the Meuse River that we will focus on as an upside -down U, as you picture a map.
[251] The Germans are on the top to the north, the meandering Meuse is in the center, and the varied French positions are on the bottom or to the south.
[252] The French 2nd Army is below the Meuse to the south, and the French 9th Army is to the left.
[253] The two ends of the U flatten out, more or less, and go away from each other.
[254] Now, the right side goes in a more southeasterly direction, while the left goes straight for a while and then turns north again.
[255] The city of Sedan is at the bottom right side of the U before it starts to head southeast.
[256] Going from left to right, The German plan called for the 2nd Panzer Division, far west of Sedan, to cross the Meuse at Doncherie and take the heights of Coipio.
[257] In the center, the 1st Panzer Division would make the main attack, cross the river just west of Sedan, charge the heights of the Marfy Woods, and hold them.
[258] They would then advance to Chacherie -Chamon, further south.
[259] The 10th Panzer Division, east of Sedan, would attack around Wallenden Court, cross the river and take the heights to their south.
[260] Once the heights were taken by the 10th Panzer Division, which is the German far left or the French far right, it's on the right hand side of our imaginary map, their artillery would be able to protect the flanks of the two other divisions to their west.
[261] Once the French were driven far enough away from the Meuse, the first two divisions, the second and the first, would turn west and then get behind the French 9th Army, which was further west and north.
[262] Another way to think of the French 9th Army's position is to the extreme left of our imaginary map, but parallel to the German starting position.
[263] So they would do almost like a U -turn.
[264] They would cross the river, push the French back, go west, and then turn north a little bit and get behind the French 9th Army.
[265] and either destroy them or drive them off.
[266] Having the Panzers come up behind the 9th Army would certainly unsettle them, and probably cause them to flee north or west, but not south.
[267] This would allow the Panzers the freedom to drive to the coast or to Paris.
[268] Either way would be open to them.
[269] They would be inside the defensive line with themselves in between the French armies and Paris.
[270] There was a plan of amazing potential, but it had risks.
[271] If the French could keep the Germans on the north side of the Meuse, they could obliterate them with their artillery while the Germans tried to cross.
[272] It was certainly possible that the French could stop the German infantry from crossing the river and their susceptible rubber boats.
[273] The German infantry would be exposed as they tried to establish a bridgehead and then occupy or drive the French off the southern bank.
[274] If somehow the attacking infantry could pull this off without their vaunted armor for support, the Germans would then be able to construct a second, stronger pontoon bridge that could hold their panzers.
[275] The French would certainly use their battalions of tanks and artillery to keep the German infantry from their objectives.
[276] May 13th, the fourth day.
[277] On the morning of May 13th, the French were still correcting their defensive positions, thinking they had one more day to complete them, when, at 11 a .m., they came under intense and constant bombardment by Stukas and gunfire.
[278] Guderian's 19th Armor Corps did not have its artillery yet, so they used their 88mm flak guns and the cannons of their tanks.
[279] Of course, since the tanks were on the edge of their side of the river, they were able to shoot at point -blank range.
[280] Surprisingly, casualties were low on the French side, as was the actual damage to French artillery.
[281] However ineffective the shelling was, it went on for five hours, and it did utterly destroy the French morale.
[282] The French gave up trying to fire back.
[283] Amazingly, headquarters was told that French positions were being bombed, but they were holding up, which was technically true.
[284] But headquarters was not told that the men were panicking as the bombardment went on hour after hour after hour.
[285] There was no air cover that day for the French troops.
[286] Gamelin asked General Villemin about the air cover for the Meuse area, even though General d 'Astierre was told there was no need for air cover.
[287] Again, to be prudent, General Villemin that evening ordered air support for the following day.
[288] But General Lafontaine Commander of the 55th Division, that was taking most of the pounding, knew attack was imminent.
[289] It was a basic military doctrine.
[290] First you shell, and then you attack.
[291] By 3 p .m. that day, La Fontaine had had enough, and he contacted General Gransard and asked for air support.
[292] But no French fighters ever showed up.
[293] General Hunsiger said, You really don't need my fighters.
[294] If I am obliged to engage them every time some threat arises, they will rapidly be used up.
[295] at four p m the bombardment stopped and the german assault to cross the river began just west of sedan the first rifle division of the first panzer division along with the gross deutschland regiment started to cross in rubber boats normally the french troops manning the pill boxes and artillery equipped with machine guns would have sunk the boats and the men before they even got to the middle of the river but the German bombardment had its intended effect on the French, who were still shell -shocked and kept their heads down.
[296] That was the main reason, but smoke from the German bombs and artillery helped hide the oncoming German assault as well.
[297] General Guderian was amazed when he found out only a handful of his boats failed to make it across the river.
[298] Once ashore, the first German objective were the French casemates with machine guns.
[299] They were quickly taken out with machine guns, flamethrowers, and charges.
[300] The French were pushed back with not too much difficulty.
[301] When dusk came, the German riflemen held the Marphy woods and its heights, across from Sedan.
[302] Guderian knew that this was his chance, and he kept his men moving forward in the dark.
[303] They next took Scheheri at 11 p .m., which was five miles south by southwest of the Marphy woods.
[304] The 2nd Panzer Division, on the German right, or French left, did not do so well.
[305] They got to the river late, tried to cross, but resistance was stiffer, and by 8 p .m. only had a few men across.
[306] But fortunately for the Germans, the French who were resisting them, found out that the French in the center or to their right were falling back, so the men who had fought bravely that day started to withdraw to protect their exposed flank.
[307] By 10 p .m., the Germans had crossed the river and taken Quapio, their objective.
[308] The 10th Panzer Division, on the German left or French right, had difficulty as well.
[309] The French artillery was making it hard for the Germans, but eventually...
[310] They got two battalions of infantry over the Meuse before dark, but they didn't get any further.
[311] General Grenzard, by 5 .30, knew that the situation was precarious, but not overly threatening.
[312] The Germans had infantry on the French side in small numbers, but not a single tank, and that's what mattered.
[313] And the French had their own tanks to deal with the German infantry.
[314] But about 6 p .m., everything began to change as fate stepped in.
[315] The 55th French Division in the center was panicking.
[316] But being pushed back under pressure was not necessarily a defeat.
[317] As long as order is maintained, your defensive line can still hold.
[318] But that's not what happened to the 55th.
[319] Normally, a retreat starts in the front.
[320] The men see, or think they see, that they are losing, turn around and run, causing others to do the same, who do not wish to be left behind.
[321] However, this time it started in the rear.
[322] Gun spotters, working with the artillerymen in the rear, instead of keeping pressure on the Germans, saw troops emerging from the Marphy woods, just south of the river, as they were pushed out by the Germans.
[323] Instead of staying calm and waiting for the infantry to form a new line with the artillery to support it, the spotters assumed a route was in progress.
[324] Although the retreating French infantry were not running pell -mell, the gun spotters became more and more alarmed as they saw more of their brothers coming.
[325] toward them.
[326] The spotters' cries soon became hysterical.
[327] The frantic rumors about German tanks being spotted at Bolsan, which was even further south than the German infantry had been able to penetrate so far, became shrieking cries.
[328] That was it for the 55th Division.
[329] The gunners started running south, leaving their cannon idle.
[330] Soon the men up front heard the gunners were leaving and soon joined them in their unorganized retreat south.
[331] Guns and ammo were thrown to the ground to speed up the running.
[332] Soon some of the officers of the two infantry and two artillery regiments were running with their men.
[333] General La Fontaine tried to stop the men as they ran past his headquarters south of Boussaint, where the German tanks were supposed to be.
[334] Again, some officers swore they saw German tanks, but the scramble of the French was only caused by German infantry and French panic.
[335] There were no takes, no artillery, and after 4 p .m., no German bombing.
[336] By 11 p .m. on May 13th, the situation had gone well for the Germans, but was still shaky.
[337] They could not have guessed what happened to the French 55th Infantry.
[338] Amazingly, General Anziger was hiding the events from Gamlon and Georges while he tried to fix things.
[339] But General Billot had the true situation down and asked General...
[340] d 'Aster of the Air Force to take out the German pontoons and any other bridges still standing.
[341] d 'Aster had to inform General Billot with a straight face that it was not possible to bomb bridges at night.
[342] Billot wanted him to try anyway.
[343] Victory or defeat hung in the balance.
[344] Billot was nervous, but so was Guderian.
[345] He had achieved a bridgehead five miles wide and five miles deep, but still.
[346] no tanks had crossed.
[347] To be sure, the German army engineers were building pontoon bridges that could hold Guderian's panzers as fast as they could, but for now, any French counterattack that included tanks could throw the invaders back across the river.
[348] The infantry still had no artillery and no anti -tank guns.
[349] General Grinsard sensed the situation was getting out of hand.
[350] and at 7 p .m. ordered two infantry regiments and two tank battalions from his reserves to move up in counterattack.
[351] Grensard was trying to build on the good news that the French 7th Army had the bridgehead of the 10th Panzer Division on the French right contained.
[352] The French reinforcements were very slow in coming up to the front.
[353] They saw some of the fleeing men, heard about the bombing, and decided to stop for now and continue on at dark when they assumed it would be safer.
[354] They finally made it to their designated positions sometime between 3 and 5 a .m. the next morning, on the 14th.
[355] They were late, scared, tired, but they had made it.
[356] They were ordered to attack at dawn and drive the Germans back across the Meuse, and with their superior firepower, they were expected to get the job done.
[357] However, the Germans had finished their pontoon bridges for their tanks late that night.
[358] At dawn, at 4 a .m., not one of the four French units advanced as they were ordered to.
[359] But two hours after dawn, at 6 a .m., panzers from the 1st Division started to cross the Meuse.
[360] May 14th, the 5th day.
[361] The French attack finally got going at 7 a .m., three hours late.
[362] The 213th Infantry Regiment, led by the 7th Tank Battalion, moved north on the French left, or German right, hoping to engage the German 2nd Panzer Division.
[363] On the French right, the 205th Infantry Regiment, with the 4th Tank Battalion, moved north as well.
[364] They were to engage either the German 10th or 1st Division, whichever one they ran into first, or had made it across with their tanks.
[365] At 7 .30 a .m., inexplicably, General Unziger, at the 2nd Army Headquarters, wired General Gamla that the breach at Sedan was closed.
[366] and a strong counterattack had started at 4 .30 a .m., but in reality, the counterattack started several hours late.
[367] We can only assume that he was hoping his prediction, because that's all it was, would come true.
[368] But at 8 .30 a .m., the French advance on their left ran into the 1st Panzer Division's brigade of tanks.
[369] The French armored battalion decided to fight and paid the price for it.
[370] They quickly lost three -fourths of their tanks.
[371] The supporting infantry retreated with no organization.
[372] This fighting finished off what was left of the 55th Division.
[373] Because of this retreat, the French right now had its left flank exposed and was ordered to retreat quickly.
[374] The French offensive was over by 9 a .m. Further to the French right, the 71st Division still held the 10th Panzer bridgehead at bay.
[375] but now its left flank was open to attack, so its commander ordered his men back.
[376] But this became, like the previous day, more of a disorganized retreat.
[377] Soon men were throwing away their guns and ammo to speed up their flight.
[378] The 71st French Division just faded away.
[379] At noon, General Hunziger sent another overly optimistic bulletin to General Georges, but then moved his headquarters further south, all the way to Verdun.
[380] It was decided that the French 3rd Armored Division, just coming up from further south, would lead another hopeful counterattack.
[381] But to put the 3rd Armored Division in perspective, it had only been formed six weeks ago and currently its units were spread over several miles.
[382] The high command, knowing the men of the 3rd had not had time to gel as a team, did not even order it into position after hostility started on May 10th.
[383] When its orders finally came on May 12th, it rushed up from Reims to the Sedan area.
[384] But in rushing, the men retired, and more importantly, its tanks were out of gas, with no immediate way to refuel them.
[385] By noon of the 14th, they started moving up to the line.
[386] The plan was for the 3rd Armored Division to break into two groups side by side and push north.
[387] Although they were still far to the south, of where the fighting had taken place so far, it was hoped that they could advance as a strong line and push the Germans back over the Meuse.
[388] If all went well, they would actually destroy the Germans before they got back over to the far side of the river.
[389] They were told that they had until 4 p .m. that day to get into place and then start their coordinated advance.
[390] But Guderian, after talking all the first part of the day to General Kirchner of the 1st Panzer Division, decided to make his move and ordered the 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions, now on the French side, to turn west at 3 p .m. Guderian's goal was to split the French 2nd Army, that was south of him, from the French 9th Army, that was to the French left or further west.
[391] This was a basic objective of any aggressor, as it weakens the opponents, who can now not unite their forces for strength or support.
[392] but for all that it was still a colossal gamble for guderian by turning west his left flank would now be exposed to the third french army coming up from the south guderian made this decision knowing that the german tenth division on the german left or french right was still being held down, and had not made it to the heights, therefore it could not protect his newly exposed flank until that night.
[393] That gave the French hours to run right into the unexpected German panzers with their guns facing the wrong way.
[394] This would, 9 out of 10 times, spell disaster for the victim.
[395] Guderian did not know about the 3rd Army coming up to meet his panzers, because for now, they were too far to the south.
[396] Had he known the potential disaster his panzers faced, it is highly doubtful he would have taken this gamble.
[397] But part of his decision was based on the premise that he had seen the best the French could throw at him, and he wasn't impressed.
[398] Besides, if his gamble worked, Paris and the coast would be open to him, just like the Manstein plan had predicted.
[399] The two panzer divisions headed west and crossed the Ardennes Canal.
[400] Without knowing it, General Flavigny, was about to be a hero.
[401] His 21st Corps was about to hit the exposed German left flank, cut off the German advance, and roll them back to the Meuse River.
[402] He had the men and the material to do it, and he had surprise, one of the most sought -after intangibles of war, on his side.
[403] General Hunsiger was still busy moving his command further south, but at 3 .30 p .m. that day, Thirty minutes after the Germans had turned west, and thirty minutes before the French 3rd Army groups were from advancing north and hitting the German flank, General Flavinly called off the advance and moved it to the next day.
[404] But then, even more incredibly, he scattered out his forces to cover a 12 -mile front.
[405] He did not know where the Germans would attack next, but he wanted all the roads to Paris blocked.
[406] His orders had French tanks on every road that led south.
[407] The fighting so far should have demonstrated to him that a few French tanks on every road could have not stopped the large groups of panzers coming from three different German divisions, but he was confident in his appraisal of the situation.
[408] Of course, General Flavenly did not know the German tanks had turned west.
[409] No one in the French army did that day on the 14th.
[410] Huntsie Garrett did have reconnaissance plans at his disposal.
[411] but there is no record of anyone ordering flights made to find out what was going on when the German tanks never showed up where the 3rd Armored Divisions expected them to be.
[412] The only order for the Air Force that day was by General Billot, and that was to take out the German pontoon bridge, the only one strong enough to hold tanks, at Gallier.
[413] As we saw in the last episode...
[414] The Royal Air Force responded to Billot's order by sending all of the bombers they had left in France, 109 Battles and Lemons, protected by French fighters, to take out the bridge.
[415] General d 'Aster, knowing more was going on here, was able to find 30 more French bombers to add to the operation.
[416] But nothing went right for the Allied Air Force that day on the 14th at Sedan.
[417] German flak destroyed 45 of the 109 British bombers, and the French lost 5 of their 30 bombers.
[418] Also, 70 French tanks were sent to help the airpower with the bridge, but they were all destroyed.
[419] The bridge held, and more German infantry, tanks, and artillery came over.
[420] Strangely, none of the surviving Allied planes noticed, or if they did, reported that the German Panzers were now heading west.
[421] All afternoon.
[422] Guderian worried over his exposed left flank, but not as much as his superior did, General von Kleist.
[423] Kleist would have to answer to Hitler if anything went wrong.
[424] Tension mounted, and at 10 .30 p .m., the two generals had a bitter argument over the telephone.
[425] But the argument was moot.
[426] Kleist, the ranking officer, ordered the advance to halt where it was until the 14th Motorized Corps could move up and help the 10th Panzer Division.
[427] push further south and take the heights needed, and then they would be able to turn west to protect the vulnerable panzer left flank.
[428] But for Guderian, the argument was moot as well.
[429] He simply ignored the order and kept his tanks moving.
[430] There was no way he was going to lose the element of surprise, a very rare and precious thing in combat.
[431] After another heated debate later that night, General von Kleist reluctantly agreed to let Guderian continue on with his advance.
[432] Guderian would have one more day to reach his objective, the town of Rathel.
[433] Rathel was located 32 miles southwest of Sedan.
[434] If it could be reached by the German armor, then the French 2nd and 9th armies would be completely cut off from each other.
[435] Also, and this was the main objective of the Manstein plan, The British expeditionary force of nine divisions, the 22 Belgian divisions, and the three French armies would be cut off from France.
[436] Paris, about 100 miles away, would be open to the Germans.
[437] This was probably uppermost in the French mines, but the coast would be open as well.
[438] This was uppermost in the German mines.
[439] Once again, General Hunziger was not entirely forthcoming in his report to General Georges on the evening of the 14th.
[440] He first left out that the area under German control south of the Meuse was 10 miles deep and 15 miles wide.
[441] He only reported that the counterattack by the 3rd Army did not get started for technical reasons, but the roads to the south were blocked.
[442] But 30 minutes later, Hunziger called George again and reported that the enemy had been stopped and caught between the Ardennes Canal and the Meuse.
[443] Again, this seemed to be what Hunziger hoped would happen.
[444] Tomorrow.
[445] So next time, we'll see a new French offensive set for the next day fall apart before it even begins.
[446] But in reality, it was over.
[447] The Manstein plan worked brilliantly.
[448] A hole had been punched in the middle of the Allied line.
[449] The Maginot line meant practically nothing in this latest war.
[450] The Allies had their best in the north, far away from the real battle.
[451] Paris was open to attack, and the Allies still hadn't figured out.
[452] that the two panzer divisions had changed course.
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