The History of WWII Podcast XX
[0] Welcome to True Spies, the podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time.
[1] Suddenly out of the dark, it's a bit in love.
[2] You'll meet the people who live life undercover.
[3] What do they know?
[4] What are their skills?
[5] And what would you do in their position?
[6] Vengeance felt good seeing these.
[7] People paid for what they'd done, felt righteous.
[8] True Spies, from Spyscape Studios, wherever you get your podcasts.
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[16] This time, I'm encouraging you to get a free copy of The Miracle of Dunkirk by Walter Lord.
[17] On May 24, 1940, Hitler's armies were on the brink of a shattering military victory.
[18] Only 10 miles away, 400 ,000 Allied troops were pinned against the coast of Dunkirk.
[19] But just 11 days later, 338 ,000 men had been successfully evacuated to England.
[20] The flower of the British Army and other fortunate Allied troops were saved to fight another day.
[21] Walter Lord certainly goes into more detail than I will in this amazing and unprecedented embarkation.
[22] But then again, he interviewed hundreds of eyewitnesses.
[23] Trust me, you'll love this story.
[24] Hello, and thank you for listening to a History of World War II podcast, episode 23, The Fall of France, part 4.
[25] By the end of May 14th, General Georges, the number two man of the French Army, was not satisfied with Huntsy Gare's action.
[26] The 2nd French Army had not fulfilled its duty to keep the Germans on the far side of the Meuse River at Sedan.
[27] Georges' dissatisfaction was palpable enough, even if he only knew half the story.
[28] Georges had given Hunsiger the 3rd Armored Division to attack, not to seal off any German breakthrough.
[29] He wanted the Germans pushed back to the Meuse.
[30] He had to be free to focus on the dial line.
[31] May 15th, the 6th day.
[32] General Georges now unsure about Hunziger, felt the need to confirm his orders to attack with the leader of the Second Army, and it was prudent that he did.
[33] Hunziger, the night before, had given no new orders for the attack George wanted.
[34] Only when Hunziger's command got a call from George's headquarters did he act.
[35] At 7 a .m. on the 15th, Hunziger ordered Flavigny to take the offensive towards the Meuse.
[36] To make sure it succeeded, Hunziker wanted the offensive based on tanks, but that was the central problem.
[37] Flavigny had spread out his tanks over several miles to cover all nearby roads that led to Paris.
[38] That morning, Flavigny's two companies of scattered heavy -beat tanks were engaged in localized actions around the Ardennes Canal and the town of Stone to the west and below Sedan.
[39] It wasn't as if they could just stop fighting and form up to attack at a given time when ordered, and Flavigny did not help their situation by waiting until 11 .30 a .m. to issue any orders.
[40] The chaos of the French armor in the area was such that it was each French tank for itself.
[41] Because of Flavigny's delay, the morning had been lost.
[42] He then recommended that the attack begin at 1 p .m., but General Brocard, who would be in direct charge of the assault, told Flavigny that the tanks could not be assembled until 3 p .m. That hour would be the new starting time.
[43] Progress appeared to be happening, but Flavigny was able to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory by basing the upcoming action on established French tactics and not what the Germans had demonstrated was effective use of armor.
[44] The tanks and their commander were put under the control of the commander of the 3rd Motorized Infantry Division.
[45] The tanks would only be acting in a supporting role to the infantry.
[46] This military doctrine the French understood and felt comfortable with, even though the Germans had clearly showed the proper use of tanks time and again.
[47] But when Flavinly found out that the heavy tanks had not assembled with the other tanks, because they were still engaged in unorganized fighting, he postponed the attack from 3 p .m. to 5 .30 p .m. But at 5 p .m., he called it off for the next day.
[48] Unfortunately, the 49th Battalion of the 3rd did not receive the message, advanced from the Mont -du -Woods, ran into a pit of German anti -tank guns, and then withdrew.
[49] The offensive was over.
[50] General Hunsiger, perhaps a better politician than soldier, waited until 5 a .m. of the next morning before telling the high command what happened.
[51] But even then, he was less than candid.
[52] He informed Georges that the attack by the 3rd Armored Division and the 3rd Motorized Division did not get started at the designated time because of technical conditions and mechanical breakdowns.
[53] Georges was not fooled, but did not have time to investigate either.
[54] He figured out after the war that the 3rd Armored Division was so scattered as to nullify its status as a division.
[55] But Hunziker and Flavigny felt anger emanated from Georges and needed a scapegoat.
[56] Hunziger tried to blame Flavigny, but Flavigny, who disliked General Brokart, his subordinate, asked him to explain the failure to attack.
[57] Of course, this question came from the very man who ordered the tanks to be dispersed.
[58] But dutifully, Brokart started writing his report, but before he was finished, was relieved of command.
[59] Even more incredibly, Hunziger was now satisfied with finding his scapegoat.
[60] and forgot about any counter -offensive.
[61] The political crisis was resolved.
[62] The military crisis, however, was for someone else to deal with.
[63] By now, he knew, as others did, that two of the three panzer divisions that had crossed the Meuse to the north of him had turned west and were advancing toward Ann.
[64] Amazingly, as far as Hunziger was concerned, the panzers, because they had turned west, were now someone else's problem.
[65] There was no longer any talk, real or imagined, about any action to stop the German tanks by him.
[66] He was content to keep his men in place and to fight defensively any localized action that came his way.
[67] He would later count his actions as a defensive success.
[68] No Germans got past his position, so mission accomplished.
[69] Hunziker would soon be promoted and serve as Secretary of War for the Vichy government.
[70] It never dawned on Hunziker that there were still 30 or more French divisions in the Maginot Line that could have been used to hit the exposed panzer's left flank.
[71] Hitler certainly considered this a potentially major problem and very probable for several days, which is an eternity in modern warfare, but Hunziker did not.
[72] So the two panzer divisions got on with moving into position to trap or rout the French 9th Army under General Corab to the northwest.
[73] The French 9th Army.
[74] May 12th to May 15th.
[75] The rest of this episode deals mostly with the French 9th Army.
[76] Remembering the imaginary map from our last episode, the upside -down U with Sedan on the right side before the river goes in a southeasterly direction?
[77] Well, to the left of Sedan, the Meuse goes pretty level for a while and then heads north for a long ways.
[78] The French 9th Army was in a long vertical line.
[79] that was positioned on the western side of the Meuse once it turned north.
[80] So imagining our map from last time, centered on Sedan, we move our view to the west and then north.
[81] The entire French force there was under General Bilot, but General Carap had more direct control.
[82] The 9th Army was about to be surprised by the panzers, but the great sweeping movement of the 2nd and 1st panzer divisions was hardly needed.
[83] The 9th Army was about to be pushed backward by the force in their front, but in his defense, General Corrapp did not have what was needed for anything other than a tertiary theater of war.
[84] The French High Command had estimated that the Germans would not be ready to even try to cross the Meuse at any location until day 6 or May 15th.
[85] With that in mind, Corrapp was aiming to have his left wing the 11th Corps under General Martin, in position by May 14th.
[86] But when he was notified that his light cavalry corps were pushed out of the Ardennes on May 11th, he had his men double -time it.
[87] Still, all but one of his divisions were traveling on foot.
[88] But even by the evening of May 12th, his 11th Corps, which was to station themselves between Dinah and Guivet, were not close to being in position.
[89] But then again, even if the 11th was ready and waiting for the German armor, it would have made little difference.
[90] The resources of the 11th made it clear that their superiors were expecting the real push to be further north.
[91] Of its seven infantry divisions, only two were expected to fight, and only one was motorized.
[92] It had very few anti -tank weapons and virtually few anti -aircraft guns.
[93] Two of its divisions did not have either one of these.
[94] It also had precious few tanks, and most of them would be lost in the Ardennes when they ran into the Germans.
[95] The neglect of the 11th Corps extended to air cover as well.
[96] They were on their own with their 26 moraine fighters and 30 observational aircraft.
[97] These numbers would mean nothing next to the German air fleet directed against it on the critical day of battle.
[98] As if to guarantee you would fail, if pushed too hard, the 9th Army had the longest front to cover.
[99] To its left, the completely outfitted French 1st Army had a front of 25 miles, and to its right, the 2nd Army of Hunsikers had a front of 38 miles.
[100] The 9th Army was expected to cover from Namur to Sedan, all along the Meuse, for 75 miles.
[101] Of all the commands in the French Army, the 9th had the longest front to cover.
[102] But it would be here, at this vulnerable and extended part of the defensive line, that another German breakthrough would occur.
[103] The French, for their part, took comfort in knowing that the bridge at Dinah was destroyed in time to prevent the Germans from using it.
[104] But late on May 12th, a German motorcycle patrol found that the No. 5 lock, which connected the island of Hou, with both banks of the Meuse, just over three miles north of Dinah, was still intact.
[105] And Hou is spelled H -O -U -X, in case I'm saying it wrong.
[106] They quickly tried to establish a bridgehead, but were pushed back by a company of the 66th Regiment.
[107] Soon a battalion of the 39th Regiment relieved the aggressive company, and things seemed to be under control.
[108] However, inexplicably, the 39th tried to patrol the bridge from the heights above, instead of the river's edge.
[109] The Germans were starting to gather across from them, and it's possible they wanted to avoid being fired upon at close range.
[110] But from their position, the bridge was hard to protect, so the Germans patiently waited until dark.
[111] When night came, the German motorcyclists crossed without being fired upon and started working their way up the slope.
[112] At 3 a .m., the Germans were in position and overran the French battalion.
[113] The Germans on motorcycles, only armed with rifles and machine guns, pushed on to the town of Anhy.
[114] To see great photos of the heights and who...
[115] Go to johnsmilitaryhistory .com slash muse .html.
[116] I haven't checked out the rest of his site, but the photos he has there are amazing, and it lets you see what both sides had to deal with.
[117] May 13th, the fourth day north of Sedan.
[118] However, the French were not panicked.
[119] They had artillery and tanks, and knew the battalion of German motorcyclists did not.
[120] A counterattack was ordered for the morning of May 13th.
[121] But the counterattack took time to organize, and before it could start, was called off after 8 a .m. Instead, the troops were told to stop the German advance and then counterattack.
[122] This was standard French military doctrine.
[123] Of course, while this was going on, the Germans were busy getting two battalions of riflemen across to help the motorcyclists.
[124] Two miles to the south of Dinah, at Beauvigny, Rama was hoping to have the same success there.
[125] but when he tried to get his 7th Rifle Regiment across in rubber boats in the morning, he was stopped by the French 66th Regiment.
[126] He even received a wound when he went down to the riverbank to assess the situation.
[127] A German company managed to get across, but was pinned down and took heavy casualties.
[128] The boats the Germans had were shredded with bullets.
[129] But Rommel kept at it, and by 10 a .m. had gotten enough riflemen across to push the French back and occupy Beauvigny.
[130] But up until then, the 66th Regiment had showed that the French could fight and inflict serious casualties on the Germans.
[131] But it had come down to Rommel, who was desperate, crossing the river himself, to lead the 2nd Battalion of his regiment.
[132] As he enlarged his bridgehead on the west side of the river, he was fortunate to face the French 18th Division.
[133] They had double -timed it to get into position and were tired and short on anti -tank guns.
[134] Normally, the 1st Cavalry Division would have supported them, but they had been mauled by the Germans in the Ardennes.
[135] By noon of the 13th, the German pocket was three miles wide and two miles deep.
[136] As when the Meuse was crossed at Sedan, the invaders did not have artillery or tanks.
[137] A French counterattack with either...
[138] or preferably both, could have driven the Germans back to the eastern side.
[139] The situation, like all the other crossings, screamed for a counterattack.
[140] After the first counterattack was called off, a commander of the 5th Motorized Division decided at 10 a .m. to launch his own.
[141] He planned to attack just west of Hu, where the Germans were in control.
[142] The operation was to commence at 1 p .m., but again...
[143] The French seemed to be fighting on the timetable of the First World War, and the battalion did not begin to move toward the starting line until 2 p .m. But on the way to the jump -off point, Stukas attacked the troops.
[144] The men took cover until the bombing was over.
[145] They finally got to their starting point at 6 p .m. By then, it was deemed too late to start the assault.
[146] Two other counterattacks were ordered that day, but were put off until the following day for various though not debilitating, reasons.
[147] General Martin, commanding the 11th Corps on the far left of the 9th Army, also decided on his own counterattack.
[148] His 18th Division was told that they would be attacking at 7 .30 p .m. While the French were waiting for 7 .30 to come, Rommel was still having more of his men cross the river.
[149] Martin's plan was to launch his attack from the Foy Woods and invade the Surinvue.
[150] where the Germans were.
[151] Martin felt good about the pending attack.
[152] His force was larger, with two battalions of the 39th Infantry Regiment, led by a company of tanks and assisted by three groups of artillery.
[153] There were the typical delays, but the men were ready by 8 p .m. But Martin had to deal with the news that even though the tanks and artillery were ready, the infantry was not.
[154] Welcome to True Spies.
[155] The podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time.
[156] Suddenly out of the dark it's appeared in love.
[157] You'll meet the people who live life undercover.
[158] What do they know?
[159] What are their skills?
[160] And what would you do in their position?
[161] Vengeance felt good.
[162] Seeing these people pay for what they'd done felt righteous.
[163] True Spies from Spyscape Studios.
[164] Wherever you get your podcasts.
[165] But unlike many of the other French commanders, General Martin decided to start the attack anyway and hoped the infantry would catch up.
[166] The armor and artillery started forward and pushed into the Bois des Serenvaux, and Rommel's motorcyclists were unable to do anything against the French armor.
[167] Many German prisoners were taken, but others managed to escape.
[168] Now all that was needed was for the French infantry to come up and occupy what the tanks had taken.
[169] but they never showed.
[170] As it got dark, the tanks, knowing the Germans could sneak up on them, backed out of the woods.
[171] This short -lived offensive was the only good news for the French 9th Army.
[172] By the end of the day, they knew that the Germans had crossed at Hou, at Modan, which is between Sedan and Denon, and at its far right flank, where it connected with the 2nd Army.
[173] This last bit of bad news we covered in the last episode, when Hunziker failed to do anything about the breakthrough of the two panzer divisions that had turned west.
[174] There was only one thing that General Korap could do to even try to salvage the situation.
[175] Late on May 13th, he ordered the 53rd Division to the Bar, which was the northern part of the Ardennes Canal that the panzers were heading for.
[176] Their orders were to stop the Germans at all costs.
[177] May 14th, the 5th day.
[178] General Georges was very worried about the latest developments.
[179] He ordered Belleau, who was over the 9th Army, to push the Germans back across the Meuse.
[180] Belleau gave his order to Carap.
[181] But Carap was thinking defensively.
[182] French military doctrine had been obsessed with the defensive since the end of World War I. So instead of attacking the Germans on his side of the Meuse with tanks and artillery, of which the Germans had none, He thought only of containment, that is, defensively.
[183] First he ordered the German bridgehead, above Denain, to be contained.
[184] Then, when reinforcements came up, and they would be in position in a few days, he would then counterattack.
[185] This is the way he and other French generals now saw war.
[186] So on the morning of the 14th, The 14th Motorized Dragoon Regiment of the 5th Motorized Division began to move towards the German motorcyclists that had crossed at Hu three miles above Dinah.
[187] Things went well.
[188] The Germans, without armor or artillery, were driven off the Wastia Heights, scattered, and 40 of them were taken prisoner.
[189] But again, Korap was thinking of only stopping the Germans, not attacking them yet.
[190] He took his 40 prisoners, and he ordered his men back to a safe defensive line.
[191] The chance to push the Germans into the river was lost.
[192] While this was going on, General Rommel's engineers finally finished building a pontoon bridge at Beauvigny, which was between Hou and Denon that morning.
[193] Rommel's tanks and artillery started to cross.
[194] His plan was to take the heights on the French side for his artillery and occupy Ongay, which would put him in a position to take Philippeville 25 miles further west.
[195] The French 18th Division fought stubbornly, but were being worn down by German bombing.
[196] There were no French fighters that day to stop them.
[197] The Germans used almost every plane they had for this front at Sedan on the 13th, but then switched to help Rommel on the 14th.
[198] The French Air Force was still south on the 14th and not very effective.
[199] Real panic was setting in on the French forces on the 14th.
[200] Stucas took out field telephones, and the jammed roads of advancing and retreating French infantry slowed messages by motorcyclists.
[201] By the end of the day, Rommel's 7th Panzers had taken Angais and Morville, halfway to Philippeville.
[202] To Rommel's credit, he had rescued his captured men from the French.
[203] About 15 miles to the south, the same situation played out for the French.
[204] The 22nd Division was pushed back the entire day.
[205] by the German 32nd Infantry Division.
[206] The Germans here had only a few light tanks, but their ally was French panic.
[207] The commander of the 22nd Division moved his headquarters west three times that day.
[208] It was now a matter of how long French units would put up resistance before they retreated of their own accord.
[209] At 7 p .m. on the 14th, General Martin, on the French left, decided to pull his two battered divisions, the 18th and the 22nd, back and form a new line that would ironically run vertically near Rommel's objective at Philippeville.
[210] The French 1st Armored Division was coming down from a position northwest of Martin to support him.
[211] The French left would be saved.
[212] The 1st Armored Division was Martin's only hope.
[213] but it should be noted that the first had been formed only five months before.
[214] It was organized as two demi -brigades, each one having a tank battalion of heavy B tanks, one battalion of light H tanks, its own regiment of artillery, and a battery of 47mm anti -tank guns.
[215] But the tanks did not have radios, had not trained as much as they could have, and its refueling support should have been much better, as we will see.
[216] But the 1st Armored Division had not seen action yet.
[217] From May 10th to the end of the 14th, it was ordered around in circles.
[218] Had it shown up early on May 14th, its strength, equal to any German armored division, could have made a tremendous difference.
[219] In addition to the quagmire of orders the first armored received for the first five days of the war, at the end of May 14th, the exhausted and badly mauled 18th and 22nd French infantry divisions got conflicting orders to retreat from General Corat and General Belot.
[220] For some of the infantrymen, the common theme of retreating was enough, and they moved west until they were physically stopped or until they were so far from the fighting that they were considered to be deserters.
[221] So some French units moved to the position of Bileau, and some moved to the position ordered by Carap.
[222] This confusing situation sped up the disillusion of the 9th Army.
[223] And it was this situation that some of the advanced units of the 1st Armored came upon.
[224] Desperate, General Carap wanted the first to counterattack immediately.
[225] But General Bruneau of the 1st Armored had to tell Carap that the earliest tanks wouldn't be in place until 8 p .m. and the rest only by 3 a .m. General Bruneau told General Martin of the French left this as well.
[226] Martin replied, not to worry, the first would get their chance tomorrow.
[227] Then to Bruneau's amazement, Martin followed this up by saying he would do his best to get the infantry to follow the tanks, but he doubted they would.
[228] When a general sounds resigned to the fact that his men will not advance under orders with tanks in support, Things can only get worse from there.
[229] At 7 .45 p .m. on the 14th, Premier Renaud had heard for the first time from Gamla that the situation was very bad.
[230] Renaud was able to find out that General Hunsinger had been pushed south from Sedan.
[231] Renaud called Churchill right away and told him about Sedan and asked for 10 more fighter squadrons.
[232] May 15th, the 6th day.
[233] Trying to salvage some part of the deteriorating situation, at 4 a .m. on the 15th, Billot informed George that he wanted to replace Carap with General Girard.
[234] Girard, if you remember, was mentioned a few episodes ago when he tried to help Holland with his failed dash along the coast.
[235] Girard did not have modern tools then, like Carap did not now.
[236] The dawn of May 15th found General Bruneau's men still trying to refuel their tanks.
[237] Most of the gasoline trucks were left in the rear of the column.
[238] This left most of his tanks with enough fuel for about two hours of movement.
[239] To Bruneau's shock, the infantry of the 11th Corps had retreated behind his position during the night without being ordered to.
[240] For the Germans, though, the situation was very different.
[241] By the morning of May 15th, their bridgehead on the western side of the Meuse had been greatly enlarged, the two French infantry divisions facing them had been routed, and two panzer divisions in full strength had crossed the river and were heading west at full speed.
[242] Full strength meant that each panzer division had its own self -propelled artillery and one motorized infantry to hold positions taken by their tanks.
[243] This was the new way of fighting wars.
[244] The first was beginning to advance toward the Meuse, about 15 miles west of Hu, just north of Dinah.
[245] They wouldn't get very far.
[246] At 7 .30 that morning, Renault called Churchill again.
[247] He spoke in English.
[248] Renault, we have been defeated.
[249] We have lost the battle.
[250] He then repeated what he'd said to the still half -asleep Churchill.
[251] Churchill, impossible.
[252] Surely it can't have happened so soon.
[253] Renault, the front is broken near Sedan.
[254] The tanks are pouring through.
[255] Churchill.
[256] All experience shows that the offensive will come to an end after a while.
[257] After five or six days, they'll have to halt for supplies, and the opportunity for counterattack is presented.
[258] I learned all this from the lips of Marshal Frosch himself.
[259] Renault.
[260] All that has changed.
[261] We're faced with a torrent of tanks.
[262] Churchill told Renault he would come to Paris.
[263] Churchill, needing more information first, called up General Georges, an old personal friend, and Georges reassured the Prime Minister that the hole at Sedan was being plugged.
[264] At 9 .30 a .m. on May 15th, the 1st Armored Division came under intense Stuka bombardment, as well as from shells from their own artillery.
[265] General Beauneau, expecting to retreat that day, before the battle was even joined, had moved five of his six batteries of artillery to the rear.
[266] and when they fired, the shells landed in the midst of the French first.
[267] Then Rommel and his 7th Panzer Division came up and attacked from the south.
[268] The first armored, with all of its deficiencies, was still a match for the 7th, but soon, after battle was joined, the 5th Panzer Division, under General Walsborn, attacked from the north.
[269] This massive tank battle raged for several hours.
[270] Both sides lost tanks, but since the Germans had more to lose, A part of the equation just came down to the numbers.
[271] Rommel, who wanted to completely destroy the first, had sent some of his tanks around the southwest side of the battle to cut off Bruneau's escape.
[272] By 2 p .m., Bruneau realized this and tried to withdraw, but most of his tanks were engaged and couldn't be pulled out without making themselves vulnerable.
[273] By the time the first armored got to the new vertical defensive line of Met Auret, and Florens, three of its four battalions had been demolished.
[274] The 28th Battalion only had three of its 36 heavy tanks left.
[275] Most had run out of gas and were destroyed by their crews.
[276] General Bruneau reported that the first had knocked out about 100 German tanks out of the 500 engaged that day.
[277] This is certainly an overestimation.
[278] To get a clear picture of Bruneau's situation as he retreated towards Beaumont, Under the general order to retreat west at the end of the 15th, he had 50 of the 175 tanks he started with that day.
[279] But on the following day, as the 1st was retreating towards the French frontier, he had only 17 left.
[280] The others had to be abandoned due to fuel shortages.
[281] While the 1st Armored Division was being mauled by the 7th and 5th Panzers, the 9th Army's right wing to the south was in complete disarray.
[282] heading pale -male for the French border.
[283] Girard arrived at his new command on the afternoon of the 15th at Vervaine, and to his amazement, found nothing there.
[284] The 9th Army no longer existed.
[285] Four days later, Girard would be in German hands.
[286] The 9th Army, at first weakened by German attacks, but then as it fled west, thinking somehow, once they were in France proper they would be safe, it disintegrated.
[287] By May 17th, The 9th Army, which had the 2nd Corps of which the 5th Motorized Division belonged, the 11th Corps of which the 18th and 22nd Infantry Divisions belonged, simply ceased to be.
[288] The Germans, still giving chase, ran into scattered remains of the 9th Army, and the fleeing men were forced to fight.
[289] Fighting for survival instead of fighting for France, they only held up the Germans for a few minutes here and there, and in one instance, for a whole hour.
[290] Meanwhile, General Lebeau, under Korap, who commanded the 41st Corps, which was the right wing of the 9th Army, but still north of the 2nd Army, had done much better than the others already covered.
[291] He was able to stop General Reinhardt's 41st Armored Corps from trying to cross the Meuse and Montherme for two days.
[292] So when he got the order to retreat on the morning of May 15th, it came as a shock to him.
[293] But again, his men were heavily engaged and could not simply withdraw without exposing themselves to punishing German fire.
[294] Also, they had no means of travel.
[295] They fought as best they could against Reinhardt's two panzer divisions of the 6th and the 8th, but with both of their flanks fleeing west, it was soon obvious that their cause was lost.
[296] They abandoned their weapons and ran, but the German tanks caught up with them and they surrendered.
[297] Libos was the 53rd Infantry Division, that was ordered by Carap to head south to stop the two panzer divisions from crossing the Ardennes Canal at the bar at all costs.
[298] But once it was ordered to go to the bar at 9 p .m. on May 13th, it received at least two conflicting orders after that to return to its original position, only to be told to indeed head south after all.
[299] So by the morning of the 14th, its men and artillery were scattered to hell and back.
[300] Scattered out.
[301] They were unable to fight in any organized way.
[302] They took on Guderian's 2nd Panzer Division, where they found it.
[303] Fought until they ran out of ammo, were decimated, and then surrendered.
[304] Soon after this, the German armor made it to Rathel on the Anne, and to Morcaret, even further to the west, 38 miles from the Meuse and behind the 9th Army.
[305] It should also be mentioned that while this was going on, General Hunziker of the 2nd Army, kept pulling his men south, and Carap, before he was replaced, kept pulling his right wing back.
[306] The gap started by the Germans between these two men was conveniently enlarged by their actions.
[307] By the evening of May 15th, three days after the Germans first assaulted the defensive line along the river, the battle for the Meuse was over.
[308] Gimelin considered that the government and his headquarters might have to move south to Loire.
[309] And while he was at it, he considered reducing his three army headquarters to just one.
[310] Gemloff finished May 15th by sending out an order for the police to stop fleeing military personnel and order them back to their units to fight.
[311] Premier Renaud had little idea of how the war was going when it came to the details.
[312] The answers he got from Gemmler were vague at best.
[313] Renaud knew only a little more than the French public, and they had to suffer through a strict military censorship that prevented the publication of any bad news.
[314] At 7 p .m. on May 15th, Renaud got another message off to Churchill.
[315] Renaud had heard from his defense minister, Deladier.
[316] and repeated his message to Churchill.
[317] We lost the battle last night.
[318] The route to Paris is open.
[319] Please send all the planes and troops you can.
[320] The call to Renault from Deladier came after Gamelin reported the situation to the war minister.
[321] American Ambassador William Bullitt happened to be in Deladier's office when the call to Renault was made.
[322] Bullitt dutifully reported the information to the American President Roosevelt.
[323] Deladier sat listening to Gemla on the phone, stupefied.
[324] No, what you tell me is not possible.
[325] You must be wrong.
[326] It's impossible.
[327] Gemla told Deladier of the German tanks that had crossed the Meuse and were near Rathel.
[328] Deladier.
[329] Then you must counterattack at once.
[330] Gemla.
[331] With what?
[332] I don't have the reserves.
[333] Deladier.
[334] Then the French army is finished.
[335] Gemla.
[336] It's finished.
[337] May 15th.
[338] was also the day the Dutch surrendered to the Germans.
[339] Next time, we'll see the French officials plan the government's evacuation from Paris.
[340] Sure, the Germans were coming that way in force.
[341] But the Manstein plan had one more surprise for the French.
[342] The unhindered panzers were heading for the coast.
[343] And finally, for listener Eraldo, who would appreciate me putting out two episodes a week, well, all I can say to that is...
[344] from your lips to God's ears.
[345] I'm trying, amigo.
[346] I am definitely trying.
[347] Welcome to True Spies.
[348] The podcast that takes you deep inside the greatest secret missions of all time.
[349] Suddenly out of the dark it's appeared in love.
[350] You'll meet the people who live life undercover.
[351] What do they know?
[352] What are their skills?
[353] And what would you do in their position?
[354] Vengeance felt good.
[355] Seeing these people pay for what they'd done felt righteous.
[356] True Spies from Spyscape Studios.
[357] Wherever you get your podcasts.