Sequoia Capital Part II (with Doug Leone)

[0] Hey, Acquired listeners.

[1] Instead of a cold opener, we want to use this space to dedicate today's episode to the late Don Valentine who passed last year.

[2] We are excited to be working with Sequoia today to bring you something really special for Part 2.

[3] And with that, on to the show.

[4] Welcome to Season 6, Episode 2 of Acquired, the podcast about great technology companies and the stories behind them.

[5] I'm Ben Gilbert.

[6] I'm David Rosenthal.

[7] And we are your hosts.

[8] Today, we tell part two of the Sequoia Capital Story.

[9] We are going to pick up where we left off in 1996 when Sequoia's legendary founder, Don Valentine, turned the firm over to Sir Michael Moritz and Doug Leone.

[10] In this modern era of Sequoia since 1996, Sequoia has been the investing partner behind an absurd number of the industry -defining companies of the last 25 years, including Yahoo, Google, PayPal, LinkedIn, YouTube, Reddit, 23 and Me, HubSpot, WhatsApp, Dropbox, Airbnb, Docker, Strype, Instacart, UiPath, DoorDash, and Robin Hood.

[11] Ooh.

[12] No kidding.

[13] And while David and I belonged into part one of Sequoia's history on our own, we have the very best person in the world with us today to help us do part two right, Doug Leone.

[14] Now, David, who is Doug?

[15] Doug is the global managing partner of Sequoia Capital, in charge of overseeing the firm's many diverse businesses, which we will get into, from Seed to Global Growth Investors, across the U .S., India, and China.

[16] Doug first joined Sequoia in 1988 after famously cold -calling Don Valentine and was the champion of Sequoia's expansion from a single $150 million early -stage fund to the multi -billion -dollar global powerhouse it is today.

[17] Welcome, Doug, and thanks for joining us.

[18] Thank you very much for having me. It's my honor to be here.

[19] It's great to have you.

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[37] Thanks, ServiceNow.

[38] And now over to David to take us into Sequoia with Doug.

[39] We're going to talk a lot about Sequoia during your time and its evolution, but before we do, we want to ask you to tell your story a little bit.

[40] Your family immigrated from Italy to New York when you were 11 years old.

[41] What brought your family here?

[42] So we had a bit of a World War II heritage where my dad's sister got married to a lieutenant, ended up in America, had a child, called mom.

[43] And so now we have.

[44] grandma for me and aunt in America and we were the Italian family with the American Ben.

[45] My first name was Douglas, but in the church you cannot be called Douglas for the simple reason that you need to have a name from one of the 365 saints.

[46] So in Italy I was Mauro Douglas Leone or Douglas, as my mom called me and my dad called me. And in school I was Mauro.

[47] When I came here, I just flipped the two names.

[48] But a long story short, my dad saw an opportunity.

[49] Maybe his career, it was not going so great in Italy, saw an opportunity to come to America.

[50] He came here.

[51] It took me about two years of my mom to come here.

[52] I went two years without seeing my dad.

[53] And then we finally came here in August 1, 1968.

[54] Wow.

[55] What did your dad do in New York?

[56] In New York, he was a service engineer for a major.

[57] marine equipment company.

[58] And the most he ever made, I remember, was $25 ,000.

[59] Wow.

[60] That's amazing.

[61] So when you arrive finally in 1968 in Lake America in 1968, by boat, I'm a Michelangelo past the Statue Liberty to the west side of Manhattan.

[62] Do you remember the first time you saw the statue of liberty?

[63] Absolutely.

[64] I remember being outside.

[65] I remember crying day one or day two and just being in a fog for the next five days when we did the crossing.

[66] Wow.

[67] That's amazing.

[68] So America in 1968 must have been pretty different than the world you left in Italy, right?

[69] How was adjusting in high school?

[70] So it was really interesting because it is what I am here today is really a product of those times.

[71] I was an only child with aunts and uncles with no children.

[72] So I was overloved, very warm, very warm upbringing, lots of trust, lots of love.

[73] And I came here and it was a shock to my system and it was abusive in high school.

[74] Imagine, you know, it's not like being in school where right now everybody preaches.

[75] You have to be good to your fellow kid and all these wonderful things.

[76] There you get the crap beaten out of you emotionally.

[77] physically and so on.

[78] We talked about this with Jan and WhatsApp.

[79] Same deal.

[80] Immigrated in high school, the same experience.

[81] And so that makes up the two sides of me, which is the very warm side, the very big heart, and the super tough side where I just don't give an inch.

[82] So you've talked about in other talks you've given that we've listened to that you do the Myers -Briggs test here at Sequoia.

[83] How do those combine into what your Myers -Briggs type is?

[84] I'm not sure those affect of Myers -Briggs, but this is how I tested early on and how I changed.

[85] People think of me as an extroverb for the simple reason that if I have to turn that on, I can, especially as I get older, I went from insufferable to charming.

[86] It's amazing how it happens.

[87] But what I really am, I'm halfway between an introvert and extrovert, exactly halfway in between.

[88] And early on, I was tested as a process -driven person, meaning my whole mind is a tree structure, there's a lot of logic to it and so on.

[89] And in 2012, when Mike Moritz stepped down and the relationship I had with Mike, he was the intuitive one.

[90] He was really the leader of Sequoia.

[91] I was one A. I was the C .O. If it helps.

[92] I understood that would not be a winning formula.

[93] I always thought that great CEOs would make lousy CEOs.

[94] Now, I'm not the CEO here, but you get the point.

[95] And so I took myself, completely out of the comfort zone and understood I had to rely on intuition.

[96] And when I was tested in Myers -Brigg by a lady that tested me, she was shocked by the transformation.

[97] And she said, you and Michael Dell are the only two people have ever tested that have made that change.

[98] And when I hear people can't change, I chuckle a little bit because I felt like I changed.

[99] I felt like I had to rely on my gut and I can't have all the answers in tree structure prior to, you know, letting people create.

[100] I can't manage every inch.

[101] I just have to let terrific people do their thing.

[102] Yeah.

[103] Well, I can totally imagine, you know, the things that we're going to talk about that you championed here at Sequoia doing that is, I think, what led to a large part of your success.

[104] So you finished high school, you must have been a pretty good student.

[105] You go to Cornell and then Columbia to study engineering, right?

[106] So I was a great student until I grew up.

[107] I went to Cornell.

[108] I got thrown out of Cornell after my first year.

[109] My first two semesters...

[110] That's not in your bio.

[111] My first two semester grades were 134 and 1 -2 -2, which is not easy to do.

[112] I did not see half of my professors because I just never went to class.

[113] And what was behind that?

[114] And I'll mention in a second.

[115] What was behind that after being abused in high school, I was never abused when I was in Italy.

[116] I was a smart kid who was athletic.

[117] In high school, oh, my God, that was rough.

[118] At Cornell, I became normal again because when I went to Cornell, I could speak English.

[119] And all of a sudden, I was one of the very accepted kids.

[120] And I kind of lost my mind.

[121] In some ways, I lost the opportunity to learn, but I became normal again.

[122] Now, for a fall term, I went to a two -year school to make up a couple of classes where I got Fs, mainly math and physics, which are my strongest classes.

[123] I mean, I love math and physics.

[124] And I also was working part -time, doing the deliveries, talking to truck drivers, and it just showed me a range of life of what life could become.

[125] Nothing wrong with truck drivers.

[126] Don't get me wrong.

[127] Was it right for me?

[128] Probably not.

[129] So a little bit of the carrot and the stick, I went back to Cornell.

[130] I did fine.

[131] I graduated, and I went to work, and I decided that I needed to do something.

[132] And that's something you end up in sales.

[133] Was Prime Computer your first job?

[134] No, the first job was selling computers for Hula Packard.

[135] I remember there were three people, there were two people in a room age 45 to 50.

[136] And they said, quote, kid, don't worry, we'll split Manhattan into thirds.

[137] And I didn't know anything, so I trusted them.

[138] Seriously.

[139] One got all the Wall Street.

[140] One got from Wall Street to 96th Street.

[141] Midtown.

[142] And by the way, this is 1979 where, it wasn't safe to walk north of 79th Street.

[143] And that's your territory.

[144] Mine was north of 96.

[145] I didn't even get 79th Street.

[146] This is pre -Juliani and Bloomberg.

[147] Oh, yeah, pre -Juliani in Bloomberg.

[148] Well, pre -the fact that we became urban and so on, burned out buildings, and so on.

[149] But that was a lucky break, because one thing that's up there is Columbia.

[150] And I remember there was a dean of the School of Engineering, Dr. Trow, but still remember his name that came from CMU.

[151] And he explained to me what the ARPA net was.

[152] And he explained to me what open systems were.

[153] And yes, I went to Prime for a year and a half because I wanted to sell computers on Wall Street because I knew that's what the money was.

[154] But that was where the short -term money was.

[155] Was there prestige associated with that?

[156] Or was it just literally?

[157] Selling money of Wall Street was money.

[158] It wasn't prestige.

[159] It was money.

[160] And Prime was the second youngest company to be invited in New York Stock Exchange.

[161] It was a go -go company I had chosen well.

[162] But I realized that was only a sales career.

[163] And I was beginning to crave for something more.

[164] I wanted to, quote, make it.

[165] What does that mean?

[166] I remember walking on 6th Avenue and seeing all these buildings.

[167] I said, how do people become successful?

[168] Clearly, there must be more.

[169] And so I said, probably I want more risk.

[170] So I co -call Vinod Kosla.

[171] Well, actually, it was Owen Brown, which was the CEO at Sun at that time.

[172] I got a job because...

[173] And have you heard about Sun?

[174] Because of open systems.

[175] I went back to Columbia, open system, calls on Microsystem.

[176] Employing number, I don't know, 50, 60, I can't remember.

[177] First people, the first person in five states.

[178] And I started doing volumes of business.

[179] So much so that the board wanted to know who this kid was.

[180] Vinot Kosla wanted to know.

[181] Scott McNeely wanted to know.

[182] That was a good sign.

[183] And I had an idea to open Wall Street.

[184] And the reason I did that, I learned of a machine called Convex, which back then was a high processing math processing type of machine.

[185] And I read in Business Week that Phechees were dropping out of Yale going to Bear Stearns on Wall Street.

[186] What does that mean?

[187] And I don't know if you want to hear the story, but the story was I got a call from Bear Stearns.

[188] They said, can we get a budgetary quote?

[189] A budgetary quote is somebody you haven't met, just wants to know how much.

[190] I gave someone, and my quota was $2 million.

[191] I gave someone a budgetary quote.

[192] hadn't met for 2 .8 million.

[193] I went on vacation for two weeks.

[194] I came back and there was a purchase order on my desk for 2 .8 million.

[195] I said, truly, holy, holy cow.

[196] I think that is the definition of product market fit right there.

[197] Exactly.

[198] And so what I did is I poured all my time on Wall Street.

[199] So much that my office was a depot because Sun could not support these systems.

[200] So my office, my desk was a print of stand that had a whole in it for the paper.

[201] with messages all around it.

[202] I had computer systems that were missing out of sun all around me because if you were down, I brought you back up in an hour and a half.

[203] I just drove to Wall Street with a machine.

[204] And Scott McNeely...

[205] So you're a support engineer in addition to Steve.

[206] Oh yeah, I was doing all this volume and I go, what's going on?

[207] And Scott came to see my office.

[208] He was impressed and horrified at the same time.

[209] This is the CEO's Sun Microsystems.

[210] And we just did lots of business.

[211] And long story short, I met Vinod Kosla, venture capitalists, what the heck is that?

[212] And I want to be one of those.

[213] Boy, 134, 122, how do you get into business school?

[214] So I went to get a master's at Columbia.

[215] I got in luckily and I did extremely well, which patted the resume a little bit so I can get into business school.

[216] And I went to business school and then I co -call my way into the venture industry.

[217] Yeah, from what I could read, you sent and called 80 different firms.

[218] So there was back then, there was a big green book called Pratt's Guide to Venture Capital Sources.

[219] No way.

[220] Somebody should publish that again today.

[221] And I took all the venture firms in three states, Connecticut, no, no, four.

[222] Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, California.

[223] And I just actually wrote letters because you wrote letters during those days.

[224] And in California, I would say things like, I'm going to be in California.

[225] Of course, I wasn't going to be in California.

[226] follow up as if, as if, you know, God knows it was coming to California.

[227] How many entrepreneurs do that to Sequoia now, to say, well, I'll be down in the Bay Area in case it happens to work for it.

[228] Yeah, well, I pushed a little.

[229] And in the case of Sequoia, there was an assistant, a spicy New York person called Barbara Russell that worked for Don, did the distribution, may have been a reception, you know, it was at a time with somebody did it all.

[230] And so I sweet talked my way with Barbara.

[231] and she tells me she's become a very good friend she's no longer here she's retired up in Seattle she said she went into Don's office and she said this kid may have something you may want to spend some time with him that's amazing so on a five o 'clock on a Monday I was interviewed by Don what did he ask you one question what's important and I talked for three minutes and silence didn't bother Don he could just be we could be quiet for an hour, it'd be okay with him.

[232] And he waited, 20, 30 seconds, would seem like an attorney to me. And then he said, what else?

[233] And I laughed.

[234] I said, Don, what do you mean what else?

[235] I just told you everything.

[236] But, you know, he liked my, how genuine I was, I think.

[237] He loved the sales approach because a great company has product from the inside out and sales from, and the customer from the outside in.

[238] And he read correctly that I'd be a hustling.

[239] but not in the word hustler, that I would hustle, that I was smart, I was human, and he knew the question was, can we reprogram him?

[240] Can we break him down to pieces and will he build himself up?

[241] Doug, what do you think in retrospect are the differences between what has made you an amazing technology investor versus what you thought would make an amazing technology investor at that point in time?

[242] It's a difficult question for me to answer because I don't think I thought.

[243] I didn't know anything about what would make a technology investor.

[244] What has led to my success is I hustled a lot.

[245] There's people like Jim Gets who can product manage with a founder or product.

[246] There are people like Mike Moritz who have incredible intuition.

[247] Guess what I did?

[248] I bet you can guess.

[249] I made thousands of cold calls.

[250] I get in front of everybody.

[251] I am not kidding when I said I went from being insufferable to sufferable over time.

[252] Charming was maybe the last five years.

[253] It's a journey.

[254] And so, exactly, it was a complete journey.

[255] And so I just worked and build knowledge and I developed a network.

[256] And some luck, there's always some luck.

[257] Lots of hustle, some brain, some skill.

[258] I was able to generate some of the right deal flow and had a very lucky good start.

[259] My first three investments were IPOs, which was good, but it also built a false sense of confidence because after that, I thought I knew something and I woke up one day in 2001.

[260] I looked at my 10 boards, and I said, oh my God, there's not a winner there.

[261] And so it was an early success, go through the abyss, and I see investors here go through the abyss, and when someone goes through the abyss, you've got to let them pull themselves out.

[262] If they come out the other side, they're terrific.

[263] And so I went through the abyss, and then I went.

[264] What were those first three that were IPOs?

[265] There was Arbor Software, which is a darling software company that went public and then merged with Iperian.

[266] Okay.

[267] When it went public, it was the largest win sequoia had ever had.

[268] A company called INS, which was a services company, built on the notion that companies cannot swallow routers as fast as they'd like to swallow routers and therefore we could have a services company a company we took public and sold for seven billion dollars to to loosened seven billion in 1998 was a lot of money and a company called renaissance software which was a wall street trading system which was which was really my strong point i understood what i was looking there.

[269] I did not know that was a Sequoia investment.

[270] And a funny story, in a case of Arbor software, if you want to know the real story, I was here for three years.

[271] I almost got thrown out.

[272] People wanted me out.

[273] Don is the one that saved me. Give, quote, give the kid more time kind of attitude.

[274] And I needed to get something done.

[275] The founders of Arbor were two weeks from bankruptcy, personal bankruptcy.

[276] That night that came to my house, I said, you got to get a deal done.

[277] I got to a deal done.

[278] I think you're investable.

[279] We created a presentation that got presented the next day to Sequoia.

[280] And the inside I had, and Don Valentine helped for that, they understood the problem.

[281] As consultant, they understood the domain of the pain.

[282] And they just didn't know how to articulate it in a fundraising pitch.

[283] And so we created a pitch.

[284] And we got the company, I say we, because even though it was in Sequoia, we got the company funded.

[285] The partners trusted me so much that one partner, and I won't tell you who.

[286] The only reason why I did it is because there was a credible co -investor in his mind, nothing to do with what I knew and said.

[287] But we got the deal done and we got the investment made, just starting with two people, not a line of code, a seed, if you will, back then, although it was a series A, two million.

[288] And we made it.

[289] So we ended part one of our Sequoia history with Don in 1996, you and Michael into a conference room and passing the firm over to you, what was that day like for you?

[290] I assume these three companies had become winners.

[291] I could imagine the conversation to wish you made Doug a partner.

[292] I'm sure it was an easy one.

[293] In one case, I had a track credit, and the other case, remember the insufferable part.

[294] And the conversation must have gone around, what is he going to be like if he's a partner?

[295] Is he going to turn into a monster kind of conversation, which I didn't, obviously.

[296] It's not as black and white as Don turned it over to Mike Moritz and me. I actually went back and looked at carrier location, not because I wanted to see how much carry I got.

[297] I wanted to see if my memory served me right.

[298] It turned out that Mike and I had more carry than the other folks.

[299] It wasn't though black and white.

[300] It's yours.

[301] We were the ones with the track, right?

[302] Well, I got promoted to GP.

[303] I had one, you know, one tenth of the carrier down Valentine in Sequoia 6, and a year into the fund, Don said we ought to change all the carry and make us all equal.

[304] He understood that he needed to make sure that young people were not going to act like associates, even though they were partners.

[305] And so he flattened the partnership in Sequoia 6, and now it's Sequoia 7.

[306] It was more Mike and I were the more aggressive ones, the ones that had a bit of a track record.

[307] I remember Don set with Mike and I. He didn't say, you're the leaders.

[308] He did not anoint us, but he had a conversation just with two of us.

[309] And Don had a green shoot of paper with all the things an investor does and check marks next to what he's willing to do.

[310] And he pushed a paper as he always would and said, you figure out if you want me around.

[311] And this is what I'm willing to do.

[312] He wanted, oh, we offered Carrie in that fund.

[313] We gave Carrie, Don, the next fund, which turned out to be the Google Fund.

[314] We actually took good care of Don.

[315] We gave some carry, not GP carry, of a couple more funds.

[316] Never aggressively asked for it.

[317] I remember when I had to walk into Don's office and tell him no more carry, three funds later, and he chuckled.

[318] He said, what took you so long?

[319] But Mike and I were the two, if you will, more senior.

[320] We rotated the partners meeting who would write down the company, who's who was the leader of the partners meeting for a year or two, until Mike stepped up and said, this is not going to work.

[321] He offered to be the one doing it.

[322] We all agreed.

[323] He did it.

[324] And so it became that Mike was really one, and I was one A, just to, I don't want to rewrite history.

[325] One A. We had exact comp.

[326] Mike was a CEO, if you will.

[327] I was a CEO.

[328] We're a partnership.

[329] And that's how we ran Sequoia until 2012.

[330] Wow.

[331] when Mike stepped down for health reasons.

[332] And Doug, as a point of clarification, when you say Sequoia 6, Sequoia 7, can you explain a little bit about that?

[333] Sorry, they're the funds, the successive funds.

[334] Sequoia 6th was a 6 fund.

[335] I see.

[336] Where I became a general partner was the last really true partnership where Don was full, full time.

[337] Sequoia 7, Don was an general partner.

[338] He had less, you know, and the partnership was run by five or six other partners.

[339] And then Mike Moritz, took the lead, and I became 1A.

[340] And give us a sense of what early stage fund number are we on now?

[341] We are in 17.

[342] Got it.

[343] Okay.

[344] So right when this happens in the transition to Sequoia Fund 7, the whole world is changing, right?

[345] Because Sequoia originally, and Don came from the semiconductor industry, and then there was the PC software wave, but now the Internet is here.

[346] Yeah, well, not yet.

[347] There's actually a few parts, and part was, first, First of all, Sequoia 5 was $67 million because a truly lack of ability to raise more money.

[348] We had raised a growth fund for $165 million that we didn't know what to do with.

[349] In fact, we invested the growth fund and the average check size in that fund was $2 million.

[350] That turned out to be a 4 .5X net funds, which is a terrific performance because we invested like a venture fund.

[351] When we raised Sequoia 6, which turned out to be the Yahoo Fund, the returns from 5 were not yet visible.

[352] When Mike and I went out fundraising Sequoia 7, the limited partner said, who the heck are you guys?

[353] And we lost some big clients.

[354] I bet.

[355] And we lost some big clients.

[356] And Sequoia 5 turned out to be a fabulous fun.

[357] Sequoia 6, an incredible fun.

[358] Sequoia 7 is spectacular fun.

[359] Sequoia 8, the Google Fund.

[360] an amazing fund.

[361] So Mike and I and the other partners got an incredible start.

[362] And then 1999, 2000 happened.

[363] We did not know the meaning of the word clawback.

[364] For your listeners, what clawback means is when your funds are doing so poorly that now you owe a lot of money back to your limited partners.

[365] And we had war room meetings here at Sequoia in 2000 where we owed more than our net worth.

[366] And how do we get ourselves out of that?

[367] And is that of the fees that you've already taken as compensation?

[368] It's fees and carry.

[369] Maybe we had an early win and we took carry and the rest of the fund is a turkey and we owe not only.

[370] Because you assume when you have early wins, you assume that the fund is going to be in the carry, but if it's not.

[371] And let me make things more difficult.

[372] And that early win, you're given shares that you hold and they go to zero.

[373] So you didn't even have that have that.

[374] So you hold the shares in your account because it's 1999, those are not real companies, the shares go zero.

[375] So we had warm conversations and we had a choice to make.

[376] And the choice to make is to borrow a line from golf, and I don't play golf called Mulligan.

[377] Most of the venture industry considers the funds in that period called the Mulligan funds.

[378] They're crappy, they lost money, but you know what, it's a do -over.

[379] We took the opposite approach.

[380] No one was going to lose money at Sequoia Capital.

[381] So we took funds that were 0 .3x, meaning if it was $100 million, that fund was worth $30.

[382] Or in that case, it was $300 or $500 is worth 30 % of them.

[383] that and we brought them up to close to 2x just by giving up fees not collecting them and reinvesting money every time we had a game we reinvested it reinvested it because we wanted to have the pride of never losing money yeah and so those were formative time for the culture and it would have been so easy for you guys to call them again we're going to take the loss on this we'll start a new fund that we get fees on you got yeah well think about it sequoia four is the Cisco Fund, Don Valentine.

[384] Sequoia 5, younger, team, older team, terrific fun.

[385] Sequoia 6, Yahoo and many others, Nvidia and many others.

[386] Sequoia 7, many companies.

[387] Sequoia 8, Google.

[388] It would have been so easy for us to call it, and we just refuse to.

[389] And we just refuse to.

[390] Doug, it reminds me a lot of the 2008 story where Ford refused to take the federal government bailout and say, yeah, yeah, it would be easy for us to do this, but reputationally it's important to us and all of our customers or your clients for the next decades to come, that we don't do this.

[391] Absolutely.

[392] And while I tell clients, those times won't be Chapter 1 in the Sequoia book, there'll be a chapter.

[393] There should be a big chapter that's devoted.

[394] It is maybe our proudest moment at Sequoia Capital.

[395] It is not when we've had, you know, we have had funds close to 20X.

[396] It is not those 20X fund.

[397] The most proud time is when we decided no one's going to lose money at Sequoia Capital.

[398] and we're going to go to work.

[399] And we went to work for 10 years to make sure those funds were in good share.

[400] Yeah, the other aspect, you know, let's listeners think this is just about reallocating fees or whatnot.

[401] It's that you had a lot of work to do with those companies because you still had those investments.

[402] It would have been easy to say, yeah, these are zeros.

[403] We're just going to do whatever.

[404] But you roll up your sleeves and say, no, we're going to turn these into returning capital at a minimum.

[405] So Mike Moritz is a Brit, strategic.

[406] Men, a few words, things 14 step ahead.

[407] I'm my gregarious Italian.

[408] And I'll tell you, it hasn't always been easy.

[409] Mike would say the same thing.

[410] But we made it work for 20 years, and I'll tell you, during those times, we thought exactly alike.

[411] You can burn us cigarettes in our arm, and we're not going to flinch.

[412] We're going to bring these funds home.

[413] And it was amazing how two different cats, with two different backgrounds, with two different styles, who got along a lot and really argued some, as you would imagine, which is terrific because that means we pour two different views on issues.

[414] That is a strength.

[415] During those times, there was no question what we were going to do.

[416] I don't think we ever had the conversation.

[417] I don't think we even said, should we do this?

[418] I just think we had to.

[419] That's a special thing to be able to get in that lockstep with another person.

[420] Do you feel like that's sort of that rare thing that happens once or twice in a person's life?

[421] And how do you attribute Sequoia's success to YouTube being in lockstep like that?

[422] On that issue.

[423] Look, it happens in sports teams.

[424] It happens when people go to war.

[425] They never again feel, why do people keep on going to Afghanistan?

[426] A reason they do that, they miss that sense of camaraderie.

[427] I don't know if you study situations like that.

[428] That was wartime.

[429] Make no mistake.

[430] Mike, we weren't, it wasn't our lives.

[431] I don't, for a second, I love and respect to people that serve our country.

[432] The things they do are far more important, far more courageous than what Mike and I did.

[433] I wanna make that crystal clear.

[434] We should be grateful to them.

[435] But it was a similar sense of camaraderie.

[436] It was your business lives.

[437] It was, no, nothing to do with business lives.

[438] It was, it was the fact, each one of ourselves in our body could not do that.

[439] Nothing to do.

[440] We've got to save our career, our money, none of that.

[441] It had to do with being a badass and doing what nobody else would do.

[442] That's what it has to do with.

[443] Do the right thing when it's inconvenient to you.

[444] Yeah.

[445] Yeah, that's because, yeah, it would have been so many other firms did throw in the towel, get them all again.

[446] Their business lives were fine.

[447] We're talking about this era right around Google's founding.

[448] And we're talking about your partner, Michael.

[449] There's a quote that I've heard you mentioned in the past.

[450] past, right?

[451] It's something along the lines of Michael telling you a few months after making the Google investment, we've never paid so much for so little.

[452] I think that quote is what John Dorr told Mike Moritz.

[453] We did know what Google did for a long time.

[454] We knew we had smart founders.

[455] We knew we were aimed at the Internet, and we just knew we had to be patient.

[456] Sometimes patience sit on your hands.

[457] You know, I had a similar but a smaller story in the Maraki.

[458] Smart founders couldn't figure out which way to go.

[459] And if you talk to them, what did Sequoia do most?

[460] They left us alone and let us figure it out.

[461] We hear that from so many founders on this show that have partnered with you guys.

[462] That's one of the biggest differentiating factors is let us, you know, we're in the driver's seat.

[463] Let us figure it out.

[464] If it's creation time, the founders create.

[465] Now, there could be execution time where they don't execute as well, in which case you help them.

[466] But the thing I tell founders, you get to do product market, you should do product market fit.

[467] We can't help you there.

[468] If you got product market fit, we can help you with everything else.

[469] And so when founders are meandering their way early on and focusing on something that's going to work later on, you just let them create.

[470] They're the creators.

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[488] The decision to expand, not just geographically, but also product -wise in terms of investment products you offer, how did that initiative happen?

[489] So the first thing, I don't like the notion of you and Michael.

[490] It is we're all standing on each other's shoulders.

[491] Michael stood on down shoulders.

[492] I'm standing on Mike's shoulders and Jim gets shoulder and rule of shoulders.

[493] So it is really we.

[494] It is really a we effort.

[495] And the other thing, when confused, there's only one curve I look at for the decisions I have to make.

[496] It's the exponential curve of accelerated change.

[497] It's not linear.

[498] It increases through time, which means if you believe in that, which means that doing nothing is the worst thing you can do.

[499] It's the riskiest thing you can do.

[500] And then we also know that in the early days of the curve, you over forecast because you're linear thinker.

[501] In the later days of the curve, when the curve is steep, you under forecast.

[502] So I'm not that smart a person, but I know these simple principles.

[503] And I know that doing, you know, do stuff.

[504] Take the shot and we'll talk more about what that means.

[505] But turn to clot back to 2003 -2004s.

[506] Mike and I are both immigrants.

[507] There's other immigrants here.

[508] Founders we look at are.

[509] immigrants, more and more founders.

[510] And so I started wondering, what happens if the world becomes globalized?

[511] They're going to go home.

[512] And I thought of NEA's offices with posters from India companies in India.

[513] And the U .S. India founder coming here, and we don't have those posters.

[514] I thought, oh, my God, defense.

[515] But defense alone should make you do things.

[516] And then you think of the world that's more globalized, the world is flat, blah, blah, blah.

[517] and I thought maybe we should go there.

[518] I learned that other firms were doing flyover, going there and flying and flying and making the brand.

[519] Or making investment dual brand.

[520] And so, you know, a few brain cells said, if we're going to do something, where are the large and growing economies?

[521] That brought us to India, so China and India.

[522] It didn't, as I say, didn't bring us to Vietnam because it grows, but it's small.

[523] It didn't bring us to Europe because it's big, but not growing.

[524] So those were the two GEOs.

[525] So we started making trips in trying to meet teams, trying to figure out how to get there.

[526] Investing teams or founding team?

[527] Investing, founding investing team.

[528] And I'm very mindful of a line from an old sitcom, from a scene.

[529] The sitcom is Hogan's Heroes.

[530] Oh, yeah.

[531] You know Hogan's heroes?

[532] So Colonel Klingk is the commander of a POW camp.

[533] And, you know, he's a POTS, obviously, in the show.

[534] And Colonel Hogan is the American who's very smart.

[535] And Hogan and Kling have a safe.

[536] And if you turn the handle one way, you open a safe and there's money.

[537] If you turn the handle the other way, it blows.

[538] It blows out.

[539] And Hogan looks at Klingk and says, Klingk, which way?

[540] And Klingk goes left.

[541] And Hogan pulls it right and it opens.

[542] And Klingk goes, how did you know?

[543] And Hogan says, I wasn't sure whether I'd get it right, but I was sure that you would get it wrong.

[544] And believe it or not, That scene is the scene that caused me to say, I know for sure Mike Moritz and I, if we make investments in China, we'll get it wrong.

[545] We didn't know if the team we found would get it right, but we thought that was the least riskiest thing to do.

[546] And so we're shopping for teams, and we came across, it's funny, I made 20 trips to China, and then the team were introduced, what was introduced to us by a founder of BillPoint, which was a predecessor to PayPal, sold to eBay, she introduces two Chinese nationals that grew up in China, had gone to school here, which is exactly the one, had moved back to China, had served on the board of the same company, focused media.

[547] One was an investor, a DFJ, one was a founder, a co -founder of a company called C -Trip.

[548] We met him on a Tuesday.

[549] We met him again on a Thursday.

[550] And on a Friday morning in a conference room of Sequoia, we did a handshake deal.

[551] No contract, no anything.

[552] They were going to another venture firm in the afternoon.

[553] They canceled that meeting.

[554] By Monday morning, Mike Moritz, God bless him, had a PPM private placement for Sequoia China won and gave it to them with a notion that you want to delight your partners.

[555] When people do a deal, after the deal's done, you always find out it wasn't as good as you thought.

[556] We love doing the opposite.

[557] We want people to be blown away.

[558] Holy cow.

[559] Sequoia culture.

[560] Of course, the second person there was Neil Shed.

[561] It was Neil Shen.

[562] There were two founders.

[563] One of them was Neil Shen.

[564] And so we went fundraising.

[565] We still didn't have a signed contract.

[566] And we raised a $160 million fund.

[567] We were ridiculed by limited partners.

[568] We held the annual meeting in Beijing in a brand new hotel where the heat broke.

[569] Everybody was freezing.

[570] We were slightly abused.

[571] That has turned out to be a spectacular fun.

[572] And the rest is history.

[573] Yeah.

[574] What are some of the companies that Sequoia China has?

[575] invested in.

[576] Pindodo, Alibaba, Maytwan, bike dance, dot, dot, dot.

[577] We've had somewhere near 50, 60 IPOs.

[578] And so I had the idea on a one -page sheet, but if I tell you that, that would leave you with a wrong impression.

[579] At critical times where we needed, this is kind of funny, when we needed operational's move, it was Mike that had the insight that we needed.

[580] needed to make those moves.

[581] It was Mike that made the move.

[582] So I've never told Mike this.

[583] I was incredibly grateful that Mr. Intuitive, as I had him slotted in my brain, became operational at key times, even better than I was, if truth be told.

[584] And so it wasn't me, it wasn't Mike.

[585] It was also quite because as we're doing this, other people were carrying the load in America.

[586] you know and so it was a team it was truly a team effort so while you were and you and Mike were sort of championing hey we should be doing this because we think that the rest of the world is going to hit this inflection point or at least these areas did you have this this is sort of a Bezosism that's more recent but was there this sort of disagree and commit mentality for anybody who was here that knew that they had to hold down the fort even if they weren't pounding the table like you were how did that go for many years there was sniping in the troops.

[587] Why are we doing this?

[588] Why are we wasting time?

[589] Because keep in mind that this is not about money.

[590] No one's making any more money because we all contribute the same amount.

[591] China contributes, we contribute.

[592] You know, it is not incremental money.

[593] Also, we're talking about the mid -2000s when, you know, Tencent and Alibaba exist, but, like, it's not clear that they're going to be, that China's going to be what it is.

[594] It's about building a dominant, world -class, global powerhouse that at the same time can act very, very local because the foundation of our business is seeds.

[595] If you lose seed and venture, you become, as I say, private equity firm because later on, all you have to compete is on price.

[596] And so how do you, at the same time, go global while not losing an inch on the local side?

[597] And some of the best seeds were made during those days.

[598] And so we somehow managed to pull that off by isolating.

[599] Well, the thing, I initially became the global person.

[600] Nobody else had to do that.

[601] Somewhere along the line, Mike and I reverse roles where he was Mr. International.

[602] I spent more time in the U .S. And in 2012, when Mike stepped down due to health reasons, we thought about should three of us run it, and we made the decision that I should run it, but we should have second in command.

[603] And the logical one was someone from the U .S., Jim gets at that time, in Neil Shen.

[604] Yeah.

[605] That makes an incredible story.

[606] Thank you for sharing all this.

[607] At the same time that you're expanding geographically, you're also expanding the suite of funds in each geography, right, in terms of adding the growth funds, then ultimately the global growth fund.

[608] How did you think about that decision and doing that as separate funds versus one fund together?

[609] and obviously the company needs were evolving with stay private longer and everything.

[610] So the most important thing, as I said, is to be the first $100 ,000 to help that founder.

[611] So whatever we did, we understood that is the strategic part of the house.

[612] We've always done seeds, but we thought both for clarity of thought, marketing, we should do at C fund because we're starting to have a lot of C programs, such as a scout fund and a whole bunch of others we don't really talk about.

[613] Then the world continued to change, and while it's never been cheaper to start a company, and by the way, I think the world change with Netscape, or at least it had a major change, which meant that we went from being deep technology investors, where we really only invested in technology pre -Netscape, to being application layer investing across many market segments, travel, shopping, iPhone, internet, being part of the reason.

[614] So a thing started to happen.

[615] It's never been cheaper to start a company, I seed investing.

[616] When you're doing deep tech investing, there's no need for seeds.

[617] It takes you two years, a little bit of product.

[618] But now...

[619] Airbnb seed was 600 ,000, I think.

[620] The Dropbox was $1 .2 million.

[621] But that's because an app can be built in a month.

[622] At the same time, though, it's never been more expensive to launch a company.

[623] Why?

[624] You've got businesses that have the words you and that economics, the O2O, online, to offline, Uber, Door, Dash, Instac, and so on.

[625] And then if you don't have those businesses, turned the clock back 20 years ago.

[626] We used to launch the U .S., let's say in B2B, we used to be profitable.

[627] Five years later, we used to go to Europe.

[628] You can't do that anymore.

[629] Because if you wait, but you can't do that.

[630] You launch the U .S. Six months later, you launch Europe.

[631] Because if you wait, by the time you get to Europe, there'll be 20 competitors, half of which want to come to the U .S. So you've got to run fast, which means you have to spend a lot of money, which means it's bigger and bigger rounds.

[632] So we were at seed investment.

[633] when we understood the companies needed more money.

[634] And keep in mind, we're the folks carrying the suitcases.

[635] We're there from day one.

[636] We're carrying the luggage.

[637] And we thought to ourselves, yes, we want partners, but why are we letting other people come in and dictate terms to our companies?

[638] We were vulnerable and weak.

[639] So we got deeper into the growth business.

[640] We vertically integrated.

[641] And then when rounds became even larger, and we have this incredible portfolio today of maybe five, six, seven hundred companies, we launched a global growth.

[642] The global growth is a global vehicle to double and triple down in the best company in the Sequoia portfolio.

[643] And yes, we partner with other firms and so on, but we're able to enjoy the full ride.

[644] I view those of being more tactical product versus C being more strategic.

[645] That's the most important one.

[646] And then we also had a hedge fund because we realize that it's way tougher to go from zero to 100 million in revenues from zero to five billion in market cap them from 5 to 25.

[647] We talked about this a lot in part one of this our Sequoia history.

[648] The vast majority of the magnitude of gains of returns happen post post -IPO.

[649] And so we learned to distribute shares to our clients carefully, not the week after the IPO or the week after the lock -up.

[650] We learned that a public investment vehicle would help us many ways, including how to look at these companies retrospectively.

[651] If you're in a hedge fund, you look back to youth and you explain how youth can grow up.

[652] Most of us that invest in scene and venture look up.

[653] We look from zero to something.

[654] The hedge fund guys look from a lot to something.

[655] So we were able to have deeper conversations about companies and what companies could become, dare to dream of what companies could become.

[656] And so we found that to be quite useful.

[657] And then we launched, the heritage business, which is to make it easy.

[658] It's a family office, endowment style.

[659] And the reason for that, we have founders and friends of Sequoia who had done quite well, and wouldn't that be a terrific way to maintain a relationship for another 30 years?

[660] And so that's why we did it.

[661] These were just to try to build a global powerhouse, which is what we want, where we conserve founders from idea to IPO and beyond to personal needs.

[662] I'll go, it'll go so far beyond when they have the personal needs so we can have these relationships that would last a lifetime.

[663] We all take a equal percentage of our profits.

[664] The venture group is walnuts.

[665] China is peanuts.

[666] The heritage fund is cashews.

[667] We blend them and then we redistribute them so that we all get a share of mixed nuts, but no one, but no one gets more nuts.

[668] It's just different kind of nuts that financially intertwine us.

[669] I see.

[670] But nobody makes more money, but we all have bought in that we're part of this team, this global team where we help one another while doing the very right things for the founders because it is all about the founders.

[671] Founders come first, by far.

[672] Limited partners, most of ours are nonprofits come second, and we come third.

[673] And it's not because we're altruistic because if we achieve that, then it's the way to run the business for the next 100 years.

[674] An interesting takeaway here is as it became more and more expensive to get to your IPO or to get to be a scale global company because you have to do things exactly like you're talking about, launch new geos faster, grow more quickly to get ahead of your competition in these winner take -all markets, you know, a major takeaway is a lot of firms took the specialization route where they say, we're purely Series A and they stay smaller, or we're dedicated seed, we're this new asset class, we're pre -seed, we're growth, or, you know, know, these large public equity institutions come private and just stay growth capital.

[675] But what Sequoia said was, look, we're just going to grow with the company the entire life cycle and take a very different approach, rather than specialization, exactly what you're saying, to follow them and have the right products for them along their entire growth curve.

[676] It's just a very different approach than a lot of people took.

[677] And certainly there are other people doing something similar today, but it feels five, ten years later than when you did it at Sequoia.

[678] I'll make two points.

[679] The first thing is I will add, I agree with everything you said, and to get there as early as possible, to be the first dollar.

[680] Second, if we said we're only an A -firm, what happens when, and no company has a linear trajectory, remember your Google question, they all have a little bump.

[681] What happens when that company is a little bump, and you have to invest in that questionable round.

[682] If you're an only, quote, a firm or only C firm and you own 20%, where's your capital to show to the new investor that you believe?

[683] And so because it's never linear, because it's never slammed down from day one, by being there, you can support the companies at times where there are darker clouds in the sky, which helps attract other investors to then get to the sunny skies.

[684] This is the perfect time, since I know we're running out of time, to switch over to Playbook.

[685] I think there are two questions I really want to ask you in Playbook, for listeners and for you, Doug, Playbook is we talk about, let's abstract out some of the themes from this conversation to what's applicable to entrepreneurs running their businesses, to us as we think about partnering with companies.

[686] The first one is it's just struck us in doing part one of the Sequoia history.

[687] what actually, like, at the core, makes Sequoia successful is some pretty simple things.

[688] It's focus on the market, founders come first, listen to what entrepreneurs tell you, you know, don't run your mouth, be a business partner, not an investor.

[689] How have you guys and you thought about staying disciplined on those core things as you've grown so much?

[690] I imagine that takes a lot of active focus and effort.

[691] Yes, there are many answers.

[692] I think our little secret is our culture.

[693] And when I was young in business, I used to hear CEOs talk about culture.

[694] I used to thought it was a talking point handed to the CEO by marketing.

[695] Nothing could be more incorrect.

[696] And the culture at Sequoia, if I can spend 10 seconds on it, is finding these quirky individuals who've had shocked to their systems who have something to prove, who, as I say, we're not the quarterback of the football team in high school, and you know what I mean by that.

[697] They were the shunned ones, if anything.

[698] Maybe a couple IQ points high or something to prove.

[699] Maybe something happened in a family.

[700] Put them in an environment of teamwork and trust.

[701] We're relatively flat at Sequoia, so we've taken comp off the table, letting them know it's okay to make mistakes, and instilling a culture that we're looking for the truth.

[702] Not your truth, not my truth, the truth in the middle of the table that helps the founder.

[703] A number of times I said in a partner's meeting after proclaiming a point, I hear one of our young partners making a point, I say, hold on a second, I didn't think of that.

[704] His point is better than my point.

[705] I changed my mind.

[706] And so, and applying that to everything that we do, and realizing that we've done nothing, realizing our worst enemy is the success we had, realizing that by virtue of a market position, not because people hate us, because who else are you going to attack?

[707] Not the number 14 firm, number number three firm.

[708] It's just more fun to attack the number one firm.

[709] It's what I would do, you know it's just more of a sport Nolan Bushnell told us sometimes or no it was Tripp Hawkins sometimes you don't want to be number one because then there's people sniping at you from behind I'm perfectly happy being two I actually argue that Don used to say that Don Valenti say let's let somebody else be one it's better to be two and so how we do that is making sure we have a mindset that we've done nothing we have a mindset that we are here from going to business if you're Amazon you've got customers you've got billions you've got relationship If you're Sequoia, you have 20 chickens walking in the back.

[710] That's all you have.

[711] 20 chickens and a reputation.

[712] So I tell people, take the darn shot.

[713] Everybody at Sequoia would know we'd rather go out of business in a week than in five years, for sure.

[714] And so it just have the mindset of take no prisoner, do the right thing when it's painful to do so, help the founders, recognize when there's no product market, you know, it's not always helped.

[715] It sounds so wonderful.

[716] point there's no product market fit.

[717] The market has spoken 19 times.

[718] Then you've got to have a different conversation with the founders.

[719] Or five EPs come see you and they say it's either him or her or all of us.

[720] Those are tough times.

[721] But that happens once out of 20 times.

[722] Some firms do the calculus that says, oh, we don't want to ruin a reputation, let bygones be bygones.

[723] We can't do that.

[724] It just goes against, remember the 1999 thing?

[725] It goes against every bone of everybody.

[726] You have to help as much as you can.

[727] It's interesting that you talk about how it's a negative all the previous success.

[728] And I've heard you talk before about how you pulled down all the posters on the walls here of all these IPOs that you've had.

[729] Barron.

[730] No posters in this room.

[731] It's very true.

[732] It's still very lovely.

[733] It is lovely.

[734] Some would argue that the way that the venture model works, a firm like Sequoia, has massive benefit from this momentum of you've made great investments which then in hindsight make you sort of look like a kingmaker.

[735] And so then you get all the best deal flow now because everybody wants to be a part of this aura that you've created.

[736] Do you think there's truth to that?

[737] Or you think that's total?

[738] There's a modicum truth of that, but success is a drug, you know, and you can't fall prey to that.

[739] You know, we've had investors here that have been successful, made some money, and didn't work us hard.

[740] You know, we have 10 tenants at Sequoia.

[741] Number one is performance.

[742] The other nine are important, but you're missing one.

[743] The other nine don't matter.

[744] You could have clarity of thought, you could have teamwork, but you're not performing, you're not here.

[745] And I tell people, we are not a family.

[746] Make no mistake.

[747] We are a team.

[748] If you don't like teams, we are a show or production.

[749] Maybe the investors are the actors, but you know, the actors don't look so good without a script, without the lighting person, without a director.

[750] And so everybody matters are the team, especially the people that make us lunch and breakfast.

[751] They're the ones we have to treat with the most kind of dignity.

[752] They are our team members.

[753] They are the ones that make this place run.

[754] And that's how Sequoia works internally.

[755] Michael wrote one of my favorite books of the last 10 years called Leading with Sir Alex Ferguson about his career.

[756] Obviously, all of that applies to Sequoia as well.

[757] But yeah, it's an organization that you're building.

[758] It's not a family.

[759] That's fantastic.

[760] Our sponsor for this episode is a brand new one for us.

[761] Statsig.

[762] So many of you reached out to them after hearing their CEO, Vijay, on ACQ2, that we are partnering with.

[763] them as a sponsor of Acquired.

[764] Yeah, for those of you who haven't listened, VJ's story is amazing.

[765] Before founding Statsig, Vijay spent 10 years at Facebook where he led the development of their mobile app ad product, which, as you all know, went on to become a huge part of their business.

[766] He also had a front row seat to all of the incredible product engineering tools that let Facebook continuously experiment and roll out product features to billions of users around.

[767] the world.

[768] Yep.

[769] So now Statsig is the modern version of that promise and available to all companies building great products.

[770] Statscig is a feature management and experimentation platform that helps product teams ship faster, automate A -B testing, and see the impact every feature is having on the core business metrics.

[771] The tool gives visualizations backed by a powerful stats engine unlocking real -time product observability.

[772] So what does that actually mean?

[773] It lets you tie a new feature that you just shipped to a core metric in your business and then instantly know if it made a difference or not in how your customers use your product.

[774] It's super cool.

[775] Statsig lets you make actual data -driven decisions about product changes, test them with different user groups around the world, and get statistically accurate reporting on the impact.

[776] Customers include Notion, Brex, OpenAI, FlipCart, Figma, Microsoft, and Cruise Automation.

[777] There are like so many more that we could name.

[778] I mean, I'm looking at the list.

[779] Flex and Versel, friends of the show at Rec Room, Vanta.

[780] They literally have hundreds of customers now.

[781] Also, Statsig is a great platform for rolling out and testing AI product features.

[782] So for anyone who's used Notion's awesome, generative AI features and watched how fast that product has evolved, all of that was managed with Statsig.

[783] Yep.

[784] If you're experimenting with new AI features for your product and you want to know if it's really making a difference for your KPI's, Statsig is awesome for that.

[785] They can now ingest data from data warehouses.

[786] So it works with your company's data wherever it's stored so you can quickly get started, no matter how your feature flagging is set up today.

[787] You don't even have to migrate from any current solution you might have.

[788] We're pumped to be working with them.

[789] You can click the link in the show notes or go on over to stat sig .com to get started.

[790] And when you do, just tell them that you heard about them from Ben and David here on Acquired.

[791] On a grading.

[792] All right.

[793] So, Doug, on this show, when we grade an acquisition, that, you know, we, big company buys little company, Facebook buys Instagram, and then we grade how good of a use of capital that was.

[794] And that instance, as you're well aware, is one of our far and away A -plus of A -pluses.

[795] And we thought about how do we do grading on an episode like this?

[796] And the way that we wanted to pose it to you are, what are some of the things as you reflect back, you know, in your stewardship and all your time at the firm, where you would say that was an A -plus and some things where you swung and missed or you watch one go by and you say, actually, you know, that's a C, D, or F, and, you know, we made up for it in this way, but this is a way to be critical of a previous decision.

[797] First of all, I'll tell you the overall grade I'd give us, and then I'll drill down.

[798] Great.

[799] Somewhere between B and a B plus.

[800] That is what I would give us.

[801] I'd give ourselves an A for the war room times of 1999.

[802] Those were our best days.

[803] I'd give a self an A for the times when we had those 51, 49 conversation where we leaned the right way.

[804] And then I give ourselves a lot of Fs in things that came through this conference room, and we just got them wrong.

[805] And we tend to get them wrong for the most often reason is that we overthink things.

[806] Sometimes we see revenue growth, even early on, and we overthink, well, what can this come?

[807] company B, and at some point, revenue growth speaks for itself.

[808] I'd give us a fairly high grade on how we treat people, how we wrap everybody in Sequoia.

[809] I give us high grades that we bring everybody in in this teamwork approach.

[810] When we have an IPO, a big one, we'll send an internal note about how many people touch a company.

[811] You would be shocked to see how many names are attached to success.

[812] I'd give us grades on how we embrace failure, our failure.

[813] It's always us.

[814] I'd give us a much lesser grade on the misses.

[815] I'd give us Fs because a lot of them came through here.

[816] So my blended grade, if I'm in a Mike Moritz mood, I'll give ourselves a B. In a Doug Leone mood, I'll give ourselves a B plus.

[817] Well, thank you for that.

[818] I mean, it truly is hard to imagine, you know, a company at some point not coming through the halls here.

[819] I'd be remiss not to ask you, can you tell us the Facebook story?

[820] This has been in a freaking Hollywood film at this point.

[821] How'd that actually go down?

[822] So my daughter from Cornell told us about Facebook very, very early on.

[823] Kristen, George, who's now a product manager at Instagram.

[824] And I told it to Rulov.

[825] And for a number of reasons, some good, some bad, some justified, some not.

[826] we were never able to get in and we knew about Facebook for a very long time which culminated in that presentation at Sequoia where Zuck mistakenly and he since said that obviously you know we've all grown up we don't hold it again Zuck came to Sequoia I wasn't in that meeting because I was in China looking for teams but then we had another shot of Facebook we had a shot of Facebook early on at a very high price and then we were asleep at the switch when all those eight nine $10 billion rounds were done completely asleep at the switch.

[827] I'd give us lower than an F. I don't know what's low in that.

[828] I'll give us a G. Well, you did have WhatsApp.

[829] Yeah, let's say that we got some Facebook shares.

[830] You got some extra credit.

[831] Yeah.

[832] Fantastic.

[833] Thank you so much, Doug, for joining us.

[834] This has been really special.

[835] Last question.

[836] How can people, and especially entrepreneurs, get in touch with you and get in touch with Sequoia.

[837] Send us an email.

[838] I remember I was on a panel once and about 10 years ago.

[839] And that same question they asked to three venture person.

[840] And the venture person next to me said, well, we like to go through law firms, intermediaries, to screen.

[841] It was my turn.

[842] I said 854 -3 -927, which was our phone number.

[843] Does that still work?

[844] It still works.

[845] I had that written down in the notes.

[846] We don't get a lot of calls, but it's email us.

[847] And make it a thoughtful email.

[848] If you send an email to 14 of us, no one's going to answer.

[849] Send us an email.

[850] That's, I don't say spend a month on it, but well thought out, you know, I was this.

[851] I want to start a company.

[852] Would you be interested in meeting?

[853] Something like that.

[854] There are some emails that just don't respond.

[855] There's no chance that, you know, there's no chance we're going to do that.

[856] And there's just too many.

[857] But if you send an email anywhere, Neil, the viability that somebody may one in 10 ,000 chances ever make an investment, you'll get a response.

[858] Love it.

[859] Be aggressive.

[860] Fantastic.

[861] All right.

[862] Well, Doug, thank you so much.

[863] Listeners, feel free to email Doug.

[864] And with that, listeners, if you aren't subscribed and you like what you hear, you should.

[865] We're available in any podcast player of your choice.

[866] If you want to become a limited partner, subscribing gets you access to.

[867] our bonus show, where we go deeper into the nitty -gritty of building companies in real time.

[868] To listen, you can click the link in the show notes or go to glow .fm slash acquired, and all new listeners get a seven -day free trial.

[869] With that, we will see you next time.