Why a Coup in Niger Has the World’s Attention

[0] From the New York Times, I'm Michael Babaro.

[1] This is a daily.

[2] Today, in a region known for rising authoritarianism and extremism, the African country of Niger seemed to be on a different path of democracy and partnership with the United States.

[3] My colleague, Declan Walsh, explains how a military coup has now put all of that in jeopardy, and why Niger's allies still feel.

[4] think it's possible to reverse that coup.

[5] It's Wednesday, August 16th.

[6] Declan, we called you a couple of days ago to talk about a coup that had just occurred in Africa, a not entirely uncommon occurrence on that continent.

[7] And you told us, without much hesitation, that this coup has taken on global importance in a way that's quite unique.

[8] Yes, that's right.

[9] I mean, it's no secret that coups have been common in a Africa.

[10] There's probably been 100 in the post -independence period the last 60 years.

[11] And in the region known as the Sahel, which is this huge zone that runs south of the Sahara Desert stretching across the continent, there's been five coups in the last three years alone.

[12] Wow.

[13] And candidly, the world kind of shrugs when many of those coups happen.

[14] But as you said, what happened in Niger in the last couple of weeks is very different.

[15] It's been called a redline coup, a coup that the U .S. and its European allies, and several major regional African countries have said that they cannot tolerate, and they're now demanding something very unusual.

[16] They want it to be reversed.

[17] Hmm.

[18] And why is that?

[19] Why are all these powerful countries so invested in and worried about this particular coup, above all these other coups in the past?

[20] Well, I think a lot of it has to do with the president of Niger.

[21] He's this guy who, who the U .S. and its allies have really invested in in recent years.

[22] His name is Mohamed Bazoum.

[23] We have to progress in this domain to tend to this Africa, integrate, prosper, and pacific.

[24] He is the first leader of Niger who has assumed power through what they call a peaceful democratic transition.

[25] In other words, he took power from another elected leader in 2021.

[26] Basum's also someone who's adopted what you might call Western values.

[27] He's been very for this honor that I've made to be invited here at the Foundation Bill and Melinda Gates.

[28] He's been promoting girls' education.

[29] He was on stage with Bill Gates in New York last winter, promoting the idea of reducing Niger's incredibly high birth rate.

[30] And to have the occasion to talk of problems that are crucial for a country like the Niger.

[31] Because that's seen as a real drive.

[32] on the country's ability to get itself out of poverty?

[33] President Bassoon, Niger has proven itself to be a willing, enabled partner in the fight against violent extremist organizations.

[34] And most importantly, for the U .S. and European countries, he's allowed them to put some pretty big military bases in Niger, which have really become the linchpin of this fight against Islamic militancy, not just in Niger, but across the entire region.

[35] Hmm.

[36] And how big a problem is Islamic militancy in the Sahel?

[37] And why is it so important to the U .S. and to its allies in Europe?

[38] Well, last year, about 6 ,700 people died across the world from extremist violence.

[39] 43 % of those deaths occurred in the Sahel.

[40] Wow.

[41] Back in 2007, that was 1%.

[42] That just gives you a sense about how this region has gone from zero to the top of, the global militancy charts, if you like.

[43] And it's centered in some of the poorest countries in the world, including Niger.

[44] And so as a result, just about every major terrorist franchise on earth has a presence in the Sahel.

[45] You've got al -Qaeda, ISIS, you've got Boko Haram in Nigeria, you've got a plethora of much smaller groups as well.

[46] And they often kind of cross -pollinate with criminal activity in these areas, which makes it just an incredibly hard problem to solve.

[47] So the US has started to move into Niger.

[48] It's set up a number of bases there, currently with about 1 ,100 troops in the country.

[49] And as well as that France, the former colonial ruler of Niger until 1960, also has a strong presence in the country with about another 1 ,500 troops.

[50] And there's also several large drone bases, some operated by the CIA, which are used to carry out surveillance operations, not just in Niger, but in neighboring countries as well.

[51] Hmm.

[52] So in what seems like a never -ending global fight against terrorism, the president of Niger, who is very close with the U .S. and its military, has become, it seems like, our number one ally in this region, which happens to be a hotbed of the very terrorism that the U .S. and its allies most fear.

[53] Yeah, it's become the hotbed.

[54] Part of this.

[55] because this is a very poor region, but it's also because many of these states are very weak and they have these exploding populations of young people who've got very few opportunities in life, and that makes them vulnerable to becoming radicalized.

[56] But the thing about Nigeria is that its alliance with the West, certainly under Mr. Bazum, seemed to be working recently because fatalities from violence fell in the first six months of this year by 40%.

[57] And that was like a huge contrast with the rest of the region where it was soaring.

[58] So this partnership would seem to be working for both sides, for these Western governments and for this current government of Niger.

[59] So bring us to this coup that clearly endangers this partnership.

[60] So one morning in late July, President Bazum is at the presidential residence in Niamé, the capital, and he wakes up with his family only to discover that the presidential guard, which is this elite military unit that's supposed to be keeping him safe, is now suddenly holding him hostage inside his own house.

[61] And he comes to realize that these soldiers have been given orders to place him under detention and oust him from power.

[62] And what do we understand to be the motives of these military figures who are staging this coup?

[63] Well, it's not immediately clear, but as time has gone on, we've sort of learned that this was basically an internal battle inside the military.

[64] Bazum's alliance with the West had certainly created, some tensions between different military units.

[65] And as far as we can tell, the general who was in charge of the presidential guard was worried that he was about to be fired and decided to move first against the president before he could be removed.

[66] And once they move against the president who is in his palace, what exactly happens?

[67] Well, in the president's residence, it turns out, there's a safe room, which since Bazum came to power two years ago, he's had kind of upgraded.

[68] So Bazum and his wife vanish into this safe room.

[69] They closed the door behind them.

[70] And he immediately starts getting on the phone with some of his allies, Western leaders, people like Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, he calls the leader of France, others, to tell them what's going on and effectively to appeal for help to get him out.

[71] At the same time, you've got protesters in favor of Bazum who start to gather in the streets.

[72] calling for his release.

[73] Because he was elected by the people, and it was a fair election.

[74] And you've got a lot of confusion about who exactly is in charge of this coup, or whether indeed the entire military of Niger is united behind it.

[75] And it's really not clear who's running the country.

[76] Because normally in a coup, it happens quite fast.

[77] the president's ousted, he is forced sometimes into a kind of humiliating resignation or he has to go into exile, and the military officers who've taken over stand up and say, now we're in charge.

[78] But in this instance, the president is out of sight and apparently untouchable, and he's reaching out to the outside world, he's issuing tweets.

[79] Some days later, he writes an op -ed in a Western newspaper.

[80] He's calling some of the world's leaders appealing for help.

[81] And so he starts to build a head of steam behind this idea that this coup might be stillborn, that there might be a way to reverse it.

[82] And that's music to the ears of these very powerful Western allies in particular who really do not want Mr. Bazum to be ousted from power because they see him as a crucial element of their military operations in the region.

[83] And so what do these international governments, these allies do once the president tells them, look, I'm in the safe room, there is a coup underway.

[84] but I think it might be reversible.

[85] So instead of what they usually do, which is kind of to shrug or to issue, you know, some condemnations, but not much else, they start also to take stronger action than normal.

[86] They immediately suspend most aid to Niger, the French and other Europeans start to evacuate their citizens from the country, military operations stop.

[87] And it also turns out that it's kind of a red line for the region as well, because this run of coups in the Sahel in recent years has, really alarmed the leaders of some of the biggest and wealthiest countries, especially Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, and a neighbor of Niger.

[88] So they're worried that these coups could be contagious, and they're also worried about this Islamist violence that it could spill over the borders and hit them too.

[89] So suddenly there's this intense diplomatic effort underway by everyone, the Americans, the French, the Nigerians, to try and pull off this feat that normally is kind of impossible, which is to pressure these coup leaders into turning around, go back to their barracks, and reinstating President Bazum, who at this point is still locked up inside his own house.

[90] And what kind of argument or what kind of incentives are being made to persuade these coup leaders that that's actually in their interest?

[91] It's basically pressure.

[92] They're cutting aid.

[93] They are having private conversations with the coup leaders, presumably wielding other sort of threats as well.

[94] But really the most striking statement comes from this regional group of countries led by Nigeria.

[95] They hold an emergency summit where they say, if the coup leaders don't step back within a week that they will consider military action against Niger.

[96] This is almost unheard of in the region.

[97] They're basically threatening war, some form of an invasion that would liberate Niger's president.

[98] Absolutely.

[99] And then on the other side of the equation, you get to the neighboring countries, Mali and Burkina Faso, which have also had coups in the last couple of years.

[100] And they leap to the defense of the coup leaders, issuing their own statement where they say they'll consider any move against this newly installed regime in Niger as a declaration of war against their own countries too.

[101] So you see the battle lines suddenly being drawn in this region between this alliance of coup countries.

[102] if you like, in the center of West Africa and these richer countries around them who are threatening to attack to try and undo the coup.

[103] So this is suddenly morphed into a very high -stakes global standoff.

[104] Absolutely.

[105] You got to remember, nobody saw this coup coming in Niger.

[106] It seemed to be a relatively stable country in this very turbulent region.

[107] And suddenly, the clouds of war looming over it, major international powers are getting involved with threats and pressure and the entire region is on this very uncertain trajectory.

[108] It's hard to believe how it's gotten so serious, so fast.

[109] We'll be right back.

[110] Declan, it's now been three full weeks since this coup occurred.

[111] This standoff between the leaders of the coup and the president of Niger persist.

[112] What happens if this coup is never reversed in the end?

[113] Well, Michael, experts will tell you that every day that passes from the start of a coup almost exponentially diminishes the likelihood that that coup can ever be reversed.

[114] And it looks like that's the direction we're going in in Niger.

[115] And those threats that the regional countries made of launching military operation have not come to pass.

[116] They now say that they're going to prioritize negotiations while maintaining that military option.

[117] And at the same time, the coup leaders themselves have really dug their heels in.

[118] They've rallied tens of thousands of supporters in a sports stadium and the captain Niamé, shouting slogans against the neighboring countries against France.

[119] So they've made it clear that they're going nowhere and they've been very belligerent in saying that if there is any whiff of a military action against Niger that they're going to resist that forcefully.

[120] And so I think it now makes sense to start thinking about who's going to benefit from this situation.

[121] And who, based on your reporting, is likely to benefit from a situation where this coup stays in place?

[122] Well, first, it's the Islamic militants.

[123] When the coups took place in neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso, attacks on civilians in those countries actually soared.

[124] In Mali, they doubled last year to about 5 ,000.

[125] In Burkina, they went up by 80%.

[126] But in Niger, in the last six months, the death toll has in fact been falling.

[127] And that's a trend that many now fear could be reversed.

[128] And why would that be, though, Declan, since in many of these countries the military stages the coup, the military is awfully good at fighting terrorism and it would seem have an interest in fighting Islamic militancy.

[129] So why does militancy grow when there's a coup?

[130] That's right.

[131] And when many of these coup leaders take over, they cite the failure to push back the militants as the reason that they're taking over.

[132] and yet they seem to be doing a worse job than anyone else.

[133] I mean, part of the reason has probably got to be that they're kind of on their own.

[134] They've got less outside help.

[135] They certainly don't have the help of these Western countries or they bring in Russian mercenaries, as in the case of Mali, to help with the fight.

[136] But the evidence from Mali has shown that that has actually been counterproductive.

[137] So that makes me think that we should assume that if the coup stays in place in...

[138] Niger, that isolation and lack of help will be present there as well.

[139] And the U .S., for example, will probably pull out and therefore be less likely to help fight terrorism?

[140] Absolutely.

[141] If this coup stays in place, the U .S. and France have indicated that they're probably going to have to pull out their troops and their drones.

[142] And frankly, it's not clear where else in the region they'd be able to go.

[143] But it is also possible that the U .S. could work with these coup leaders to try and find a way to stay.

[144] But if they don't, clearly the biggest price might be paid by people in Niger, because it's become clear that it's much harder to fight these militants if you don't have the backup of sophisticated drones and Western technology.

[145] And we've seen that quite vividly in Mali and Burkina Faso.

[146] If the U .S. does ultimately pull out, it would seem that that might create a benefit for another set of parties are rivals.

[147] I'm thinking about China, for example, because we have been in competition for years with China when it comes to trying to have influence in Africa.

[148] The Daily did an episode a couple of months back about this very conflict, and what's become clear is that China has real.

[149] superseded the U .S. in developing strong relationships with countries throughout Africa, building bridges and government buildings and ingratiating itself with leaders across the African continent.

[150] This situation can't possibly help the U .S. in that competition with China.

[151] Yes, it would be bad, but not just against China.

[152] This coup also benefits another U .S. rival, particularly in this part of the world, Russia.

[153] And how does it benefit Russia?

[154] Because like the Chinese, the Russians have been trying to expand their influence in Africa across the continent in the last number of years, but in a very different way.

[155] While China has been coming in with infrastructure and trying to exploit precious minerals in Africa, the Russians have come in with the Wagner Group.

[156] And when the Wagner Group turns up in an African country, you generally know things are not going well.

[157] As you recall, it's this infamous mercenary group basically operates under Russian.

[158] military intelligence, and it's come into a series of countries, including some right beside Niger, you've got Mali, you've got nearby Central African Republic and Sudan, and the Russians offer mercenary services in return for usually access to golden diamonds and things like that.

[159] There was this really interesting moment just after the coup in Niger, when you had supporters of the coup on the streets waving Russian flags in downtown Niamé, some of them chanting slogans in favor of President Putin, stoking these suspicions that the Kremlin, in fact, had a hand in the coup.

[160] Now, I think there's no evidence that that is true, but it is a sign of how Russia has really successfully positioned itself in Africa as a kind of torch of anti -establishment, sometimes even anti -Western feeling in some of these really poor and troubled countries.

[161] And, of course, if Russia gains a good deal of influence in Niger, we, can probably safely assume that it will do things that are very much not in the interest of the United States.

[162] That has been the history of Vladimir Putin all across the world where possible he will seek to make things harder for the U .S. I mean, it would almost certainly cause the U .S. to pull out of Niger.

[163] And then secondly, like you said, it seems like the Russian policy often seems to revel in this idea that it can cause disruption, reduce Western influence in these countries, but not necessarily bring something better.

[164] And that's what we've seen in those other countries in the region.

[165] I mean, listening to you tick through who benefits from this coup lasting, it becomes very clear just how much downside there is for the United States, if that happens.

[166] And that makes me wonder whether the United States could have done anything better to have prevented this coup.

[167] And when the U .S. government has, you know, a thousand plus troops in a country, I assume, I think we all assume that it is very wired in and very invested in the health of the government that hosts our troops, it wants that place to be stable.

[168] That doesn't seem to have happened here.

[169] Yeah, I think you're right.

[170] There's been already huge amounts of second -guessing going on about how the U .S. has handled this coup, but also about U .S. policy more broadly towards.

[171] Niger.

[172] I talked to this one analyst who told me that it reflects this idea that the American model of being super focused on defense and security, on terrorism, on bringing these kind of big -ticket military items like drones to a country like Niger and special forces, but at the same time, neglecting to make the kind of long -term investments in these countries in improving governance and really taking a stand, for instance, on things like corruption that might make for a more solid partner government and actually protect against the kind of coup that we've seen happen recently and that has the potential to sort of sweep away all those gains in one fell swoop.

[173] As one person said to me, it's really striking that despite all of the money and security assistance and aid that Western countries have poured into Niger in recent years, it just took a handful of soldiers with guns, probably 12 hours to overthrow the country's president and declare that they were in charge.

[174] And I think that that tells you that you've got to step back and look at what's going wrong, not just in the coup in Niger, but about policy more generally towards these countries.

[175] Right.

[176] And there's a very cruel irony in this, which is that by being so focused on terrorism and militancy in a place like Niger, rather than perhaps on its long -term stability, the U .S. has perhaps unintentionally allowed something to happen that may make terrorism and militancy that much worse.

[177] That's right, and this is an area of the world that desperately needs help.

[178] The Sahel has some of the poorest countries in the world.

[179] It has these exploding, youthful populations, and yet it's got these incredibly weak states that are unable to provide even the most basic services for their people.

[180] And the result is that is that you have this huge, soaring populations of frustrated, jobless, young people, which really makes them very vulnerable to recruitment by these militant groups.

[181] And the danger is that the spread of militancy is increasing the conditions for the coups, and the coups, unfortunately, are increasing the conditions for things to get worse.

[182] And so we see the danger after this coup in Niger is that extremism is going to spread and that the number of poor Nigerians affected by violence is going to grow.

[183] Declan, I'm curious about the status at this point in the coup of Niger's president, this staunch U .S. ally.

[184] Is he still stuck in the safe room inside of his palace?

[185] Well, as best as we know, he's certainly still in his residence.

[186] Now, whether he's still in the safe room is unclear, but the coup leaders have certainly been doing their best to get him out.

[187] They've turned off the power to his residence, apparently his food, supplies are running low.

[188] He doesn't have access to a doctor.

[189] We've had the US, the UN, and others expressing fears about his safety and what's going to happen next.

[190] And then just this weekend, the coup leaders threatened to prosecute Mr. Bassoon for treason.

[191] So frankly, you know, things are not looking good for the deposed president or indeed for the hopes of those countries who think there's still a chance this coup can be reversed.

[192] The truth is that with every day that goes past, the coup leaders are getting stronger and stronger, and the chances of reversing the coup itself seem to be getting weaker and weaker.

[193] O'Deklin?

[194] Thank you very much.

[195] We appreciate it.

[196] It was a pleasure, Michael.

[197] We'll be right back.

[198] Here's what else you need to another day.

[199] Former President Trump has 10 days to turn himself into prosecutors in Georgia to face charges that he and 8 .000.

[200] other people orchestrated a criminal enterprise to reverse the results of the 2020 election in the state.

[201] On Tuesday, in response to those charges, Trump claimed that he would soon release a report showing, quote, irrefutable evidence that election fraud had occurred in Georgia.

[202] That prompted Georgia's governor, Brian Kemp, to declare that Trump was wrong.

[203] In a statement, Kemp said, quote, our elections in Georgia are secure, accessible, and fair.

[204] Today's episode was produced by Mary Wilson and Eric Kruppke.

[205] It was edited by Mark George, contains original music by Marian Lizano and Diane Long, and was engineered by Alyssa Moxley.

[206] Our theme music is by Jim Rundberg and Van Landlark of Wonderly.

[207] That's it for the daily.

[208] I'm Michael Bobaro.

[209] See you tomorrow.